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COMMENTS
The Right to Strike the Jury Trial Demand in
Complex Litigation
JEFFREY OAKES*
During the last forty years, the increasing complexity of
problems in the law and the merger of law and equity have cre-
ated difficulties for federal judges trying to develop an analytical
framework for determining the scope of the seventh amendment
right to jury trial in complex litigation. The issue arises when,
due to the jury's inability to comprehend the facts and therefore,
to perform adequately its factfinding function, the seventh
amendment comes into conflict with the constitutional guar-
antee of due process. The author suggests three separate methods
of analysis, historical, functional and constitutional, and explains
how these analyses permit a judge constitutionally to strike the
jury in complex litigation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1791, when the seventh amendment' was included in the
Bill of Rights, the complexion of litigation in federal courts has been
* J.D., University of Miami School of Law, 1979; former Articles and Comments Editor,
University of Miami Law Review; Associate, Davis, Polk & Wardwell, New York, New York.
1. "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-
examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law."
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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drastically altered. Undoubtedly, one of the most significant
changes was the merger of law and equity into a single court upon
the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 The in-
creased complexity of the law that resulted from technological, so-
cial and legislative developments, combined with the merger of law
and equity, has created difficult analytical problems for judges at-
tempting to determine the scope of the seventh amendment right
to trial by jury. The analysis is particularly troublesome in the
context of complex litigation where the subject matter may be be-
yond the comprehension of an average juror. The purpose of this
article is to demonstrate that the jury trial demand may be denied
in complex cases on both historical and constitutional grounds.
Prior to merger, courts resorted to an historical inquiry to deter-
mine whether litigants were entitled to trial by jury in civil cases.
The traditional test, labelled the static historical test, required a
judge to ask whether the action was heard at law or in equity by
English courts in 1791. In the former case, trial by jury was deemed
constitutionally mandated; if the answer was unclear, the courts
would analogize to the closest historical counterpart.3 The develop-
ment of the static historical test is discussed in part IV of this
article.
After merger, the Supreme Court developed a more flexible
analytical framework adapted to changed procedure and societal
needs. This analysis, referred to herein as a functional analysis,
examines the factfinding capabilities of the jury in light of modern
procedures. The functional analysis emanates from the third prong
of the test that the Supreme Court introduced in a footnote of Ross
v. Bernhard' for determining whether an issue is legal or equitable:
"[Tihe 'legal' nature of an issue is determined by considering, first,
the pre-merger custom with reference to such questions; second, the
remedy sought; and, third, the practical abilities and limitations of
juries."5
2. Congress authorized the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure for the
federal courts by passing the Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 415, 73 Stat. 651 (1934). The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were the result. For an example of a procedure instituted
upon the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that converted an equitable
into a legal action, see FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b), concerning the appointment of special masters.
3. If this static historical interpretation of the seventh amendment were applied in an
antitrust case, for instance, a jury would always be required because actions for damages were
historically on the legal side of the court. See note 81 infra.
Alexander Hamilton pointed out the dangers of a static historical test during the debates
over the adoption of the seventh amendment, recommending that any jury trial guaranty be
capable of adaptation to a changing society. See note 97 and accompanying text infra.
4. 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
5. Id.
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A functional analysis takes into account the jury's role as fact-
finder and considers whether the jurors are capable of performing
that task. The Ross test does not, however, obviate the need to
consider historical materials; indeed, the first two prongs mandate
such an inquiry. A functional historical analysis is explored in parts
H and I of this article. The functional historical test requires exam-
ination not only of causes of action traditionally heard at law or in
equity in 1791, but also of the jury's factfinding function as it devel-
oped in England and Colonial America. If a judge concludes that a
contemporary jury would be unable to perform its factfinding func-
tion in a manner consistent with the goals of truth and fairness the
jury system was intended to promote,' the judge can strike the jury
without violating the spirit of the seventh amendment.
Some courts have apparently relied solely on the third factor of
the Ross test to deny jury trials even though historical practice
dictated that a jury trial was warranted.7 In essence, these courts
interpreted Ross as holding that a judge has discretion to determine
when the inability of the jury to reach an intelligent decision would
render the remedy at law inadequate and permit the judge to try
the case in equity. The decisions leading to Ross and to the post-
Ross cases in which the jury was struck are discussed in parts V
through VII.
The functional analysis used by those courts also raises impor-
tant due process issues. If the jury is unable to perform its factfind-
ing function competently in a complex case, it seems doubtful that
6. The advantages the jury system was thought to offer were pointed out by Mr. Justice
Hunt in Sioux City & P. Ry. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873):
Twelve men of the average of the community, comprising men of education and
men of little education, men of learning and men whose learning consists only in
what they have themselves seen and heard, the merchant, the mechanic, the
farmer, the laborer; these sit together, consult, apply their separate experience of
the affairs of life to the facts proven, and draw a unanimous conclusion. This
average judgment thus given it is the great effort of the law to obtain. It is
assumed that twelve men know more of the common affairs of life than does one
man, that they can draw wiser and safer conclusions from admitted facts thus
occurring than can a single judge.
Id. at 664.
In Sioux City, a defendant railroad, on appeal from an adverse judgment in a tort suit,
had asserted that since the facts were undisputed, the question of negligence was one of law
to be passed on by the court, rather than by a jury. Justice Story's response was the above-
quoted statement. While perhaps his observations rang true in 1873, there has been a consid-
erable increase in the complexity of litigation since that time, which raises the question
whether twelve men could today draw "wiser and safer conclusions. . . than [could) a single
judge." Id. See pt. II § D infra,
7. Traditionally, a plaintiff could invoke equitable jurisdiction where the remedy at law
was inadequate. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478-79 (1962).
1980]
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the decision the jurors reach will be either fair or rational. Yet, due
process requires an impartial adjudicator capable of assessing the
facts. Thus, there is an apparent conflict between the right to trial
by jury and the right to a fair trial. In part VII it will be argued that
this aspect of the jury trial problem was recognized by the Ross
court and that the Ross test is therefore of constitutional dimen-
sions. A judge using a due process standard should be able to deny
a demand for jury trial in a complex case even where historical
practice would have required trial by jury.
A. The Factual Context
The case of ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., I pres-
ided over by Judge Conti, provides a striking example of the factual
context in which the jury trial problem arises.' Judge Conti was
assigned to try a law suit filed by a competitor of the largest com-
puter manufacturer in the world. The competitor alleged that the
giant corporation had monopolized, or was attempting to monopo-
lize, the computer industry. The judge recognized that the issues
involved in such antitrust litigation would require jurors to master
both advanced computer technology and sophisticated financial
principles. Moreover, he expected the trial to last for several
months. Despite the complexity of the issues and the length of trial
time predicted, Judge Conti exhibited his strong commitment to the
institution of the jury trial by refusing to grant defendant's motion
to strike the jury.
The trial, in fact, lasted for five months and consumed ninety-
six trial days. The parties called eighty-seven witnesses whose testi-
mony filled more than 19,000 pages of transcript. More than 2,300
exhibits were admitted into evidence. Upon completion of the trial,
after deliberating for nineteen days, the jury found itself hopelessly
deadlocked, and Judge Conti was forced to declare a mistrial.
Judge Conti concluded that, although the jurors had been con-
scientious and diligent, they were simply unequipped to decide a
case involving "technical and financial questions of the highest
order." The difficulties that the jury encountered in grasping the
8. 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
9. The question of complexity has generally arisen in antitrust and securities cases,
These types of cases tend to be highly technical and of such size that the trials last for several
months. See, e.g., id. (antitrust; five month trial); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp.
983 (D. Conn. 1978) (antitrust; fourteen month trial); In re United States Financial Sec.
Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977) (securities trial estimated to last two years or
more).
10. 458 F. Supp. at 447.
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expert testimony presented during the trial became apparent when,
in response to the judge's inquiry as to whether this type of case
should be tried to a jury, the foreman replied, "If you can find a jury
that's both a computer technician, a lawyer, an economist, knows
all about that stuff, yes, I think you could have a qualified jury, but
we don't know anything about that.""
In addition to the jury's difficulty in understanding the case,
other problems are inherent in a decision to permit a jury trial in
such a complex case. Most obvious is the difficulty encountered
when attempting to assemble a group of jurors who are free to sit in
a trial estimated to last ten months. In the IBM case, 175 prospec-
tive jurors were called; after excuses were heard, only twenty-nine
candidates remained from which to select fourteen jurors. The ma-
jority of jurors selected were over fifty years of age, and only one had
even a limited technical education. Rather than representing a true
cross section of the community, this group represented the much
smaller class of people who could spend ten months empanelled on
a jury: housewives, unemployed persons and retired citizens. Under-
standably, the individuals selected from this group had trouble
applying concepts like "cross elasticity of supply and demand,"
"market share," "market power," "reverse engineering," "product
interface manipulation," "discriminatory pricing," and "barriers to
entry." 2
Another problem is the burden such a case imposes upon the
judicial system: IBM occupied the court and its staff exclusively for
seven months, the court had to go off the new case load assignment
for that period of time, and jury' expenses amounted to $32,000.
Naturally, this investment of time and expense was completely
wasted when the court was required to declare a mistrial. 3 Given
the eventual mistrial and Judge Conti's subsequent recommenda-
tion that plaintiff's demand for a jury trial be stricken in the event
of a remand, a significant question is raised: Would it be possible
to formulate a constitutional and historical basis for denying the
jury trial demand prior to trial?
B. Defining the Issues
The factual context of IBM raises a number of important issues
that must be decided before the jury trial request can be denied in
11. Id.
12. Id. at 448.
13. Id.
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complex civil litigation." As noted above, the traditional (static)
historical test required that all those issues that would have been
heard in a court of law rather than in equity at the time of the
adoption of the seventh amendment, be tried before a jury. Since
money damages (historically a legal remedy) are normally requested
in all private antitrust suits, the static historical test presents a
problem to a judge sitting on a complex antitrust case. Faced with
that test, Judge Conti apparently had no options when the jury trial
motion was presented to him; he could not have struck the jury trial
demand and still remained faithful to the seventh amendment.
With the benefit of hindsight, however, Judge Conti realized
that the trial was too complex for a jury to handle. This raises two
principal questions. First, is there another standard by which Judge
Conti could have exercised his discretion before trial to rule that the
suit was beyond the capabilities of the jury and still have remained
true to the seventh amendment? Second, what goals was Judge
Conti seeking to foster by permitting the jury to hear and decide the
IBM case and can these goals be reconciled with a decision to strike
the jury before trial? These are the two issues which I propose to
resolve in this article.
Before addressing the problem in detail, however, it is essential
that some definition of complex litigation be offered. It is not
enough to say that when the jury fails to serve its function as a
reasoned decisionmaker, the litigation is complex. 5 Complex litiga-
tion must involve more than a complicated factual pattern." Gener-
ally, those courts that have struck the jury trial demand have also
found a combination of these factors: 7 large quantities of informa-
14. See Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 92 HARv. L. REv.
898 (1979). The conclusions reached by the author are essentially the same as those reached
here. There are, however, several differences in the reasoning employed to reach these conclu-
sions. This comment places more emphasis on the development of a historical test to support
the decision to deny a jury trial request. Also, the third prong of the Ross test, standing alone,
may not provide an adequate justification for denying a jury demand, as that author suggests.
Id. at 906. An historical perspective and a more fully developed due process argument are
essential to providing a sound rationale for striking the jury in complex litigation.
15. The conception [of complex litigation] draws heavily on the model of jury
deliberation . . . , according to which the jury reaches a verdict by deduction and
inference from the facts in evidence. In the abstract, a case is too complex for a
jury when it prevents the jury from functioning in this fashion; that is, when it
leaves the jurors unable either to comprehend the facts in evidence or to reason
from them to a verdict.
Id. at 898 (footnote omitted).
16. The Supreme Court has stated that complicated facts alone do not provide a reason
for denying a jury trial. Curriden v. Middleton, 232 U.S. 633, 636 (1914); United States v.
Bitter Root Dev. Co., 200 U.S. 451, 472-73 (1906).
17. See text accompanying notes 239-50 infra.
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tion to absorb, 8 highly technical issues, 9 large numbers of plaintiffs
and defendants," various laws to apply to the facts," and an antici-
pated lengthy trial time.2 Given a mode of analysis that utilizes
these criteria as practical guidelines, there should be little fear that
the judge's discretion to deny a demand for jury trial could be
abused.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE JURY TRIAL SYSTEM IN ENGLAND
The seventh amendment to the Constitution of the United
States guarantees that: "In Suits at common law, where the value
in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved, and no fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-
examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law." The language of the amendment has,
however, created numerous analytical problems regarding the scope
of the right to trial by jury.
Traditionally, courts interpreted the phrases "suits at common
law" and "shall be preserved" as guaranteeing trial by jury only in
those actions that existed at English common law in 1791 when the
seventh amendment was adopted.2 ' In examining historical materi-
als, however, the inquiry should not be limited to ascertaining which
actions were tried at law in 1791, but should also be directed at
discovering what functions and purposes the jury fulfilled in the
English legal system at that time. Although a comprehensive histor-
ical description of the development of the jury system in England
is beyond the scope of this article,2 that historical data which sheds
18. See, e.g., ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal.
1978); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re United States
Financial Sec. Litigation 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation,
420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
19. See, e.g., ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal.
1978) (complex and difficult economic concepts); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79
F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (accounting and procedural complexities).
20. Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (400 to 900 class
members suing 11 defendants, alleging antitrust violations relating to over 1000 contracts;
defendants filed counterclaims and claims in setoff); In re United States Financial Sec.
Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977) (18 cases, involving five plaintiff classes and 100
defendants, consolidated for trial).
21. See, e.g., note 19 supra.
22. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re
United States Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977); In re Boise Cascade
Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
24. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388 (1942); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S.
(3 Pet.) 433 (1830); notes 129-43 and accompanying text infra.
25. A few British historians and others have produced such comprehensive studies. See
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light on the questions posed above will be analyzed.
Commentators on the development of the jury thought that it
advanced certain cherished ideals. Although they recognized that it
had certain defects, both Blackstone and Holdsworth thought the
jury system was invaluable. Holdsworth, for instance, recognized
that a common jury"6 might "have neither the desire nor the capac-
ity to weigh the evidence, or to arrive at a conclusion upon the facts
in issue,"" but, despite this major shortcoming, argued that the jury
made five significant contributions to the legal system and society.
First, since juries were not bound by precedent as were judges,
the jury could decide hard cases equitably without worrying about
the possibility of making bad law. Second, the jury was thought to
preserve the dignity of the bench; when the judge's role was limited
to that of advising the jury, the judge could take a more judicial
attitude, and "no odium [could] attach to him whatever . . .the
verdict of the jury."28 Third, "[t]he jury itself [was] educated by
the part which it [was] required to take in the administration of
justice. The jury system [taught] the members of the jury to culti-
vate a judicial habit of mind."'" It instilled in them a respect for law
and order and reenforced their notions of duty to society by includ-
ing them in the governmental process. Fourth, the jury system
tended to make the law more intelligible by providing an interface
with the realities of daily life.3 Fifth, and finally, the jury brought
to the inside, technical world of the common law system an outside
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *447-504 (Tucker ed. 1803); 3 E. COKE, FIRST INSTITUTE OF
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *447-504 (J. Thomas ed. 1836); 1 W. HoLWswoRTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 298-350 (7th rev. ed. 1956); 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I (2d ed. 1898); Thayer, The Jury and Its
Development, 5 HARV. L. REv. 249, 295, 357 (1892).
26. For a discussion of the distinction between a common jury and a special jury, see
notes 61-73 and accompanying text infra.
27. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 25, at 347-48.
28. Id. at 348.
29. Id.
30. Holdsworth wrote that a clever man, constructing theories in order to decide analo-
gous cases, will be interested,
not in the dry task of deciding the case before the court, but rather in the con-
struction of new theories, the reconciliation of conflicting cases, the demolition
or criticism of older views. The result is a series of carefully constructed, and
periodically considered rules, which merely retard the attainment of a conclusion
without assisting in its formation. . . .Rules which are so refined that they bear
but a small relation to the world of sense will sooner or later be swept away. ...
The jury system has for some hundreds of years been constantly bringing the rules
of law to the touchstone of contemporary common sense.
Id. at 349 (citation omitted).
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sense, an "outside animation," that no single individual could pos-
sess.
3'
Blackstone, whose praise of the jury system was lavish, consid-
ered it a distinctive feature of the British Constitution.
[T]he trial by jury ever has been, and I trust ever will be, looked
upon as the glory of the English law. And, if it has so great an
advantage over others in regulating civil property, how much
must that advantage be heightened, when it is applied to crimi-
nal cases! . ..[Ilt is the most transcendant privilege which any
subject can enjoy, or wish for, that he cannot be affected either
in his property, his liberty, or his person, but by the unanimous
consent of twelve of his neighbours and equals.3"
Blackstone also eulogized the metamorphosis of the jury into a fact-
finder and extolled its development as a shield from partiality and
injustice .3
The belief shared by Holdsworth and Blackstone that the jury
system fosters desirable goals" was accepted during the American
Colonial period and still persists today. 5 In some instances, the
theories of those commentators remain viable; however, they must
be considered in light of certain underlying assumptions and in the
context of the time in which they were formed.
Blackstone assumed that the jury was the best investigator of
truth" and that a litigant would be judged by a jury of his equals. 37
31. Id. at 350.
32. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at *379 (emphasis added).
33. [T]herefore a competent number of sensible and upright jurymen, chosen by
lot from among those of the middle rank, will be found the best investigators of
truth, and the surest guardians of public justice. For the most powerful individual
in the state will be cautious of committing any flagrant invasion of another's right,
when he knows that the fact of his oppression must be examined and decided by
twelve indifferent men, not appointed till the hour of trial ....
Id. at *380.
34. For example, the five contributions described by Holdsworth, see notes 28-31 and
accompanying text supra, all tended to promote the goal of legitimizing the judicial institu-
tion. This was achieved because the jury system Holdsworth described was geared to temper
the application of unyielding legal concepts with the communal sense of equity and justice.
Consequently, it was assumed that the particular litigants, and eventually the society as a
whole would be more willing to accept the decisions of the judicial tribunal. W. HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 25, at 348-50. Moreover, the jury system was thought to promote the goal of
protecting individual liberties. See notes 32-33 and accompanying text supra.
35. See J. FRANK, COUmTS ON TRIAL 108-09 (1949). Professor Frank, however, attacks the
traditional belief that the jury system is essential to individual liberty and democracy. Id. at
108-45.
36. See note 33 supra. Blackstone also wrote, "[W]e cannot but admire, how scrupu-
lously delicate, and how impartially just the law of England approves itself, in the constitu-
tion and frame of a tribunal, thus excellently contrived for the test and investigation of truth
." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at *365.
37. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
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Holdsworth assumed that a litigant would be more content with the
measure of justice meted out by a jury than by the judge." When
those men glorified the jury system, however, it is improbable that
they had anticipated the possibility of jurors facing protracted anti-
trust litigation involving giant corporations or federal agencies argu-
ing complex market theory. It is suggested here that, in such situa-
tions, jurors are not necessarily the best investigators of truth. Fur-
thermore, it can no longer be assumed that the rights of the parties
will be affected only by the unanimous consent of twelve of their
equals. Thus, Holdsworth's assumption that litigants will always be
more content with a jury verdict is also subject to doubt. These last
points will be clarified in the following discussion of the develop-
ment of the jury system in England.
A. Early Stages of Development: Empanelling the Jury
Originally, jurors were selected from the area where people were
most likely to be familiar with the case. In fact, jurors were often
witnesses of the particular act in question."a This procedure was
apparently thought to guarantee not only truthfulness but also fair-
ness to the parties."° Blackstone, at this stage of the jury's develop-
ment, admired how the system was adopted -and framed "for the
investigation of truth.""
The jury was assembled when the court awarded the sheriff a
writ'" commanding him to
cause to come here on such a day, twelve free and lawful men,
liberos et legales homines, of the body of his county, by whom
the truth of the matter may be better known, and who are
neither of kin to the aforesaid A, nor the aforesaid B, to
recognize the truth of the issue between the said parties.'3
Once the jurors had been notified, the date of trial was set." Because
38. See note 34 supra.
39. W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 25, at 333.
40. It was so essential to have some neighbors on the jury, that if the visne appeared on
the record to be wrong, there were grounds for a mistrial, for motions to arrest the judgment
or for reversing it by error. This caused serious problems as parties made trivial objections to
the visne to challenge a just verdict. Eventually, it was necessary for parliament to step in
with various statutes to remedy these problems. The 4 & 5 Ann., c. 16 directed "that every
venire facias shall be awarded from the body of the county in which the action is triable." 3
E. COKE, supra note 25, at *465 n.8.
41. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at *355.
42. The writ was called a writ of venire facias ("that you may cause to come").
43. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at *352 (footnote omitted).
44. Id. at *352-53.
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their failure to appear would result in default, a compulsory process
was awarded against the jurors, 5 commanding the sheriff to present
their bodies or take their land as a pledge until they fulfilled their
duties."
Jurors had to meet certain criteria before they could serve.
They had to reside in the vicinage because their familiarity with the
facts was considered indispensable to providing the fairest forum.'
If, however, a "fair and impartial" jury could not be obtained in the
vicinage, a change of venue could be ordered" to protect the defen-
dant's right to a trial by impartial jurors.19 Jurors had to be free
men, indifferent to the cause they were to try, and lawful men,
neither outlawed nor infamous. Coke described the most desirable
juror as follows:
First, he ought to be dwelling most near to the place where
the question is moved.
Secondly, he ought to be most sufficient both for under-
standing, and competency of estate.
Thirdly, he ought to be least suspicious, that is, to be indif-
ferent as he stands unsworn: and then he is accounted in law
liber et legalis homo . . ..
If these safeguards failed, the final insurer of the sought-after
impartiality and fairness was the method of challenging a proposed
45. In the Court of Common Pleas, it was a writ of habeas corpora juratarum ("that you
have the bodies of the jurors"); in the King's Bench, a distringas ("that you distrain", which
meant to take a pledge of property until the juror performed his obligation).
46. Blackstone believed the procedures followed in pretrial stages of litigation rendered
trial by jury superior to "any other method of trial in the world." The person returning the
jurors was of "fortune and consequence" and therefore was less likely to commit errors. He
was also bound by oath faithfully to execute his duty. The trial occurred several weeks after
the panel was returned to the court on the original venire, thus permitting the parties to
receive notice of the jurors. Since the trial was held in the county where the witnesses and
jurors lived, the parties saved travel expenses. Finally, the judges were strangers to the
county, which removed partiality, and were equally trained, which ensured uniformity of
judgment. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at *354-56.
47. Coke wrote "if issue was taken on the fact alleged, it might be tried by a jury of the
visne or neighborhood, which our ancestors conceived to be more likely to be qualified to
investigate and discover the truth, then persons living at a distance from the scene of the
transaction." Id. at 465.
48. W. HYAr, HYATT ON TRIALS 424 (1924); see 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at *349-
50. Coke wrote:
Wherein the most general rule is, that every trial shall be out of that town, parish,
or hamlet, or place known out of the town, . . . within which the matter of fact
issuable is alleged, which is most certain and nearest thereunto, the inhabitants
whereof may have the better and more certain knowledge of the fact.
3 E. COKE, supra note 25, at *464-65 (footnote omitted).
49. See 3 E. COKE, supra note 25, at *464-70.
50. Id. at *460 (footnotes omitted).
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jury or juror. The challenge to the array was an exception to the
entire panel. Such an objection could be raised on the grounds of
partiality or default by the sheriff or his under officer who arrayed
the panel.5 Challenges to the poll were challenges of individual
jurors and were broken into four categories. Blackstone accepted the
categories as they were originally described by Coke,52 who listed
them as follows: first, for respect of honor;53 second, for want or
default;54 third, for affection or partiality;5 fourth, for crime delict.56
The causes for removal were generally consistent with the goal of
attaining an impartial panel capable of finding the truth. The first
category of challenges, which prevented a lord from sitting on the
jury of a commoner and vice versa, permitted the parties to obtain
a jury actually composed of their peers. The second category im-
posed the requirement of ownership of land in the vicinage; the
amount of the freehold estate required depended upon the amount
in controversy.57 From these challenges, one could infer that the
system was geared to guarantee that the jurors had both primary
knowledge and understanding of the particular dispute. Thus, all of
the procedures for empanelling the jury were aimed at ensuring that
no man would "be affected either in his property, his liberty, or his
51. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at *359; 3 E. COKE, supra note 25, at *469-73.
52. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at *361.
53. Propter honoris respectum. The common law divided the people of England into
lords of parliament and the commons of the realm. The former included barons, viscounts,
earls, marquesses and dukes. The latter included knights, esquires, gentlemen, citizens,
yeomen and burgesses. Anyone who came to be judged could only be judged by his peers.
For example, if any of the yeomen were to be tried, a baron could not be empanelled. 3 E.
COKE, supra note 25, at *475.
This historical fact highlights a significant assumption underlying the common law
method of ascertaining the truth: it was believed that only a peer could judge the actions of
a member of his class because only he would be able to understand the issues that arose.
54. Propter defectum. In order to serve on a jury, one had to be a free man and a property
holder who was not alien-born. The freehold owned had to be situated in the county where
the cause of action arose. Id. at *475-76.
55. Propter affectum.
[Tihe law presumeth that one kinsman doth favour another before a stranger
...and how far remote soever he is of Kindred, yet the challenge is good. And
if the plaintiff challenge a juror for kindred to the defendant, it is no counter-plea
to say that he is of Kindred also to the plaintiff, though he be in a nearer degree;
for the words of the venire facias forbiddeth the juror to be of Kindred to either
party.
Id. at *477. Coke offers numerous examples of proper challenges under propter affectum.
56. Propter delictum. If the juror was attainted or convicted of treason, or felony, or for
any offense to life or member, or in attaint for a false verdict, or for perjury as a witness, or
in a conspiracy at the suit of the king, he could not serve as a member of the jury. Other
m rongdoings could also prevent service. See Id. at *481-82.
57. Id. at *476.
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person, but by the unanimous consent of twelve of his neighbours
and equals. "5
B. Transition of the Jury from Witness to Factfinder
Only gradually did English jurors cease to be witnesses and
become judges of fact. 9 Legal historians Pollock and Maitland at-
tributed the transition of the jury from witness to factfinder to three
elements found in the ancient jury trial system: the arbitral, the
communal and the quasi-judicial elements. 0 The arbitral element
was most evident in the composition of the juries from the sixteenth
through the eighteenth centuries, and is particularly noteworthy for
the purposes of this discussion. It is closely associated with the
special jury, which seems to have been used with great frequency'
during this period. Though the special jury was not actually an
arbitrator, its verdict was considered a mode of proof since both
parties "put themselves" upon the jury, consenting to be bound by
the outcome.2
Even as early as the mid-fourteenth century, a special jury had
been required in particular types of cases. During the reign of Ed-
ward Im, he issued the "Ordinance of the Staples," which granted
jurisdiction of disputes over staples to mayors and constables. Those
disputes were to be ruled by the law-merchant and not by the com-
mon law. 3 A second ordinance of Edward I required, in the case
of an ordinary dispute, that if both parties were aliens, the cause
was to be tried by aliens; if denizens, tried by denizens; and if one
party was an alien and the other a denizen, then the "inquest was
to be composed of half and half."'" Both ordinances are examples
of the arbitral element in an extremely early period.
The concern that the jury represent, in its composition, the
interest of both litigants was also evident in the mid-seventeenth
century. 5 In some insances, depending on the nature of the case,
58. See text accompanying note 32 supra (emphasis added).
59. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 25, at 332.
60. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, supra note 25, at 623.
61. See Thayer, supra note 25, at 300.
62. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MATLAND, supra note 25, at 623.
63. 27 Edw. 1H, st. 2, c. 8 (1353).
64. 28 Edw. II, st. 2, c. 13 (1354). Thayer states that the jury of the "half tongue," "de
medietatem linguae," was founded on considerations of policy and fair dealing, rather than
a wish to provide a well-informed jury. Thayer, supra note 25, at 300 n.1. While there may
have been no wish to provide a well-informed jury, one could infer that a merchant jury of
the same alienage as the litigant would be better prepared to try such a case and therefore
would be better informed, though perhaps not of the particular facts in the case. At the least,
it can be said that such juries were established to offer fairer dealings between litigants.
65. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArILAND, supra note 25, at 632 n.3. Pollock and Maitland cite
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juries were composed of experts and men of particular trades. 6 For
example, mercantile disputes were heard by juries composed of mer-
chants familiar with commercial law. 7 Thhyer suggested that the
use of the special jury was a natural result of the principle "that
those were to be summoned who could best tell the veritatem rei. ""
Blackstone reported that special juries were originally intro-
duced in trials at bar," "when the causes were of too great nicety
for the discussion of ordinary freeholders. ... 70 By statute either
party was entitled, upon motion, to have a special jury for the trial
of any issue at bar or at assizes." The moving litigant was required
to pay the extraordinary expense unless the judge would certify.that
the cause required a special jury.72 Read together, Blackstone and
the statute indicate that actions held at bar, which were generally
of great importance or difficulty,73 were usually not heard by a com-
mon jury, but by a special jury with expertise in the area of dispute.
From this, one can infer that the English system recognized that
certain disputes were beyond the understanding of the common
jury. In those cases, the jury system was retained through the calling
of a special jury, thus protecting notions of fairness and impartiality
and upholding the idea that a jury should understand the dispute.
two particular cases for support of their arbitral position. First, the Bishop of Ely and Abbot
of St. Edmund were tried by a jury of eighteen knights, six chosen by each litigant, while
the remaining six were chosen by two other men. Second, Edward I, in his Carta Mercatoria,
granted a foreign merchant the right to have six foreign merchants on his jury. The historians
conclude from this that the jury, when taken as a whole, should be impartial "while its
component parts should in some sort represent the interest of both litigants." Id.
66. In London, jurors of cooks and fishmongers sat in trials when one of them was
accused of selling bad food. See Thayer, supra note 25, at 300.
67. Thayer quoted one case from the King's Bench in 1645-46:
The court was moved that a jury of merchants might be retained to try an issue
between two merchants, touching merchants' affairs, and it was granted, because
it was conceived they might have better knowledge of the matters in difference
which were to be tried than others could who were not of that profession (Lilly's
Pract. Reg. ii 154).
Id.
68. Id.
69. Black's Law Dictionary defines "trial at bar" as "[a] species of trial now seldom
resorted to except in cases where the matter in dispute is one of great importance and
difficulty. It takes place before all the judges at the bar of the court in which the action is
brought." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1676 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
70. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at *357. During this period, it appears that although
special juries could be used at bar without consent of the parties, at nisi prius consent was
required before a special jury would be returned. Thayer, supra note 25, at 301.
71. See 3 Geo. II, c. 25, s xv-xxii (1730). If the motion were granted, then jurors were
chosen only from those with the requisite special qualifications.
72. See 3 Geo. II, c. 18 (1751). The statute was designed to prevent the abusive use of
the special jury.
73. See note 69 supra.
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The special jury, combined with the methods of jury selection de-
scribed above, guaranteed the parties an impartial and an informed
adjudicator of fact.
The points made here bear repetition. Developments in the
evolution of the jury system were functionally related to its pur-
poses: providing the best method for discovering the truth about a
dispute and offering a fair forum. This functional relation is perhaps
best typified by the frequent use of a special jury. Methods of as-
sembling and challenging jurors ensured not only impartiality, but
also a panel of jurors who were frequently of the same profession and
always of the same peer group as the litigants. The system guaran-
teed a jury with a better understanding of the particular cause,
regardless of the difficulty or complexity of the dispute.
C. Suits in Equity
As pointed out in the beginning of this section, the earliest
interpretations of the seventh amendment focused on the distinc-
tion between suits at common law and suits in equity.7" Complete
understanding of the language of the seventh amendment, however,
requires further analysis.
In addition to examining the purpose of the jury in the English
courts of law, one must examine its role in equity, that is, the
relationship between the jury and the English Court of Chancery
when the seventh amendment was adopted. It should be noted at
the outset, however, that legal scholars disagree about the practices
and authority of Chancery in the eighteenth century, as well as
about the significance of equitable procedures in relation to inter-
pretation of the jury trial guaranty.
75
For example, two respected legal historians have argued that
practice in equity in 1791 was in a state of transition; that the
authority of the Lord Chancellor to decide questions of fact had not
been clearly established as a proper exercise of his discretion" and
that, consequently, he generally, if not invariably, submitted dis-
puted factual issues to common law juries for resolution.77 The pro-
ponents of this theory suggested that two inferences could be drawn
74. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
75. The leading debators are Harold Chesnin and Geoffrey Hazard, on one side, and John
Langbein, on the other. Compare Chesnin & Hazard, Chancery Procedures and the Seventh
Amendment: Jury Trial of Issues in Equity Cases Before 1791, 83 YALE L.J. 999 (1974) with
Langbein, Fact Finding in the English Court of Chancery: A Rebuttal, 83 YALE L.J. 1620
(1974).
76. Chesnin & Hazard, supra note 75, at 1019.
77. Id. at 999.
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from their findings. First, they hypothesized that the phrase "suits
at common law" was intended to cover all cases in which a jury was
normally used in the English legal system in 1791, regardless of
whether the trial was at law or in equity. Alternatively, they specu-
lated that the provision was a compromise: the use of juries in suits
at common law was to be guaranteed; the use of juries in equity was
left in question, but not foreclosed.78
Those conclusions drew a prompt and persuasive rebuttal. An-
other leading scholar contended that the Court of Chancery did
indeed have and exercise factfinding power7 and that, even when
the court chose to delegate that function to the jury, it did so not
because it lacked authority, but because it was overworked. 0
The unresolved debate over the use of the jury by the Court of
Chancery makes it clear that history sometimes provides only am-
biguous clues to be used in interpreting the seventh amendment.
The historical distinctions between modes of proof available and
types of relief granted in equity and at law8 provide equally few
78. Id. at 1020-21.
79. Langbein, supra note 75, at 1620. Langbein discusses a long line of cases demonstrat-
ing the exercise of factfinding power by Chancery prior to 1791. He distinguished the cases
cited by Chesnin and Hazard by showing that they were merely examples of actions over
which Chancery lacked subject matter jurisdiction, rather than cases in which it lacked
authority to resolve factual disputes. Id. at 1620-28. Langbein was alarmed by the Chesnin-
Hazard thesis because of its "potential for mischief in our courts." Id. at 1620. He thought
their conclusions implied that the seventh amendment might require federal courts sitting
in equity to submit factual issues to a jury. Id. Langbein advocates fewer, not more, jury
trials. Id. at 1630.
80. Id. at 1630.
81. Law and equity had concurrent jurisdiction over many subjects. See 4 W. BLACK-
STONE, supra note 25, at *430-31; 1 W. HoLswoRTH, supra note 25, at 449, 451-52. They
differed, however, in their modes of proof, the manner in which trials were conducted and
the relief available. For example, in the case of proof, when the facts rested only in the
knowledge of the parties, the suit was heard in equity, because only equity could apply itself
to the consciences of the parties and purge them upon oath regarding the truth of a matter.
4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at *436. Procedurally, only a jury could determine facts if
the case were at law, but a judge determined facts if it were in equity. But see notes 75-80
and accompanying text supra.
In addition, only equity could provide certain remedies, due either to the inflexibility of
the common law or the lack of proper procedures at law. For instance, the Chancellor inter-
fered in cases when the rigidity of law made enforcement of a strict legal right contrary to
equity. Fraud, forgery and duress are excellent examples of actions courts at law could not
consider. The Chancery could also issue an injunction against the enforcement of any judg-
ment at law that would lead to injustice. See 1 W. HOLDSWOlrrH, supra note 25, at 457.
Suits in contract provide another example of a situation in which legal remedies were
inadequate. The common law only slowly developed a theory of contract law which would
allow enforcement of simple contracts. Even after the middle of the fourteenth century, when
the common law courts began to develop an adequate theory, they still offered relief only in
the form of damages. To obtain specific performance, it was still necessary to bring an action
in equity. Id. at 455-56.
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guidelines because many of them have been lost in the evolution of
modem procedure, and a party may now enter a single court to
obtain both legal and equitable relief.8 2
Consideration of the underlying reasons for trying a suit in
equity rather than at law is much more useful than simplistic histor-
ical categorization of actions. If the law courts were unable to re-
solve a dispute satisfactorily, due to defects in pleading or proce-
dure, inflexibility, lack of authority to provide the desired relief" or
inability to deal with the intricacies of the case," then equity was
to provide an adequate remedy. For example, the remedy at law was
always considered inadequate when disposition of a case depended
upon unraveling extremely complex financial relationships between
the parties. The action required an accounting of monies owed, and
actions of this type were always heard in equity because juries were
assumed incapable of untangling such complicated matters."
D. Analysis
This overview of the development of the English legal system
was intended to demonstrate that it is not sufficient merely to inter-
pret the language of the seventh amendment as a automatic guaran-
tee of a jury trial in all suits for damages. One must also look at
history in order to discern what function the jury served, and what
function equity served, in 1791. Although the jurors of that time
may have heard cases of some complexity in which damages were
sought, members of those juries were selected in such a way as to
82. Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1976), for instance,
jury trial is available in cases where legal issues are involved, but relief is primarily equitable
in nature.
83. [T~he procedure of the court enabled the Chancellor to give remedies in
cases in which the common law either could not act at all, or could not act with
effect. The Chancellor by means of the writ of subpoena and his power to commit
for contempt exercised strict control over the persons of all parties to a suit. He
could order them to act in any way he saw fit in order to secure justice. Thus he
could examine them; and, in aid of proceedings either in his own court or in the
courts of common law, could enforce the discovery of documents in their posses-
sion.
W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 25, at 458 (footnotes omitted).
84. See note 85 and accompanying text infra.
85. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478-79 (1962). An action for an account-
ing seems, at first blush, closely analogous to a modem antitrust suit, which frequently
involves complicated business matters. Because the remedy for violation of the antitrust laws
is treble damages, however, such suits also resemble actions at law. Thus, if the jury trial
request in an antitrust action is to be denied, it must be denied on a more adequate basis
than that of an overly-simplified analogy to the historical accounting. See notes 262-64 and
accompanying text infra; Note, Unfit for Jury Determination: Complex Civil Litigation and
the Seventh Amendment Right of Trial by Jury, 20 B.C.L. REv. 511, 528 (1979).
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ensure that they could understand the issues and thus serve their
function as factfinders. In extremely complex cases, the matters
were simply taken away from the jury and sent to equity.
History demonstrates that the common law jury thus per-
formed its factfinding function in a manner consistent with its pur-
pose of promoting the notions of fairness and due process. Therefore,
a judge who concludes that a jury in a complex case is not able to
perform its factfinding function, as defined by the historical con-
text, would necessarily have to conclude also that the remedy at law
is inadequate. Hence, by applying a functional historical test, he
would be able to deny the motion for jury trial without violating the
spirit of the seventh amendment.
III. THE TRANSPLANTING OF THE JURY SYSTEM
TO AMERICA
A. The Adoption of the Seventh Amendment
Provisions for jury trials in early colonial charters"8 and subse-
quent state constitutions 7 attested to the popularity of the jury as
an institution at the time the federal constitution was proposed.
Nevertheless, at the Constitutional Convention, the delegates re-
jected the civil jury trial provision without a dissenting vote.8 A few
commentators have attempted to interpret the deceptively simple
language of the seventh amendment in light of what is known about
the ensuing ratification debates.8 ' Those commentators have fo-
cused on two questions in their historical analyses: (1) In which
types of cases did the framers intend for jurors to sit and why was
their presence considered necessary? (2) In jury trials, what role did
the framers intend the jurors to play in deciding the outcome?"
86. See 2 KENT'S COMMENTARIES 2 (14th ed. J. Gould 1896) (commenting on the 1692
charters of Plymouth and Massachusetts Colonies). A representative charter provision from
1677 read: "That the tryals of all causes, civil and criminal, shall be heard and decided by
the virdict or judgment of twelve honest men of the neighbourhood, only to be summoned
and presented by the sheriff of that division. 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 129 (1971).
87. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S. Ct. 645, 656 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Maryland Declaration of Rights, reprinted in I B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 86, at 280; North
Carolina Declaration of Rights, id. at 287; Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, id. at 265.
88. 1 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 86, at 438.
89. Two authors have uncovered most of the historical data in this area: Edith Hender-
son and Charles Wolfram. Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARv.
L. REV. 289 (1966); Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh.Amendment, 57
MINN. L. REV. 639 (1973). See also, Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S. Ct. 645, 655-64 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
90. See Wolfram, supra note 89, at 710.
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Unfortunately, as the following discussion is meant to demonstrate,
history provides no dispositive answer to these questions.
The drafters of the proposed constitution claimed that a jury
trial guaranty in civil cases was excluded because of the difficulty
in arriving at a particular clause that would satisfy all of the states,
which at that time had varying jury practices.' The Federalists"
argued somewhat ingenuously that a detailed provision would be
"inappropriate in a document of first principles,""3 but a vague,
general provision would not reconcile the variant practices." Thus,
it was deemed best to leave the problem to the legislature for future
regulation ."
The Federalists did not oppose the jury trial itself; they ob-
jected to the inclusion of a specific guaranty in the Constitution?
Hamilton, in Federalist No. 83,91 argued that if a jury trial provision
were finally added, it should be written so that its meaning could
evolve over time.
[Tihe changes which are continually happening in the affairs of
society, may render a different mode of determining questions of
property, preferable in many cases, in which that mode of trial
now prevails. For my own part, I acknowledge myself to be con-
vinced that, even in this state, it might be advantageously ex-
tended to some cases to which it does not at present apply, and
might as advantageously be abridged in others. It is conceded by
all reasonable men, that it ought not to obtain in all cases. The
examples of innovations which contract its ancient limits, as well
in these states as in Great Britian, afford a strong presumption
that its former extent has been found inconvenient; and give
91. For background on these practices, see. Henderson, supra note 89, at 299-332.
92. The Federalists supported the adoption of the Constitution as it was written when -
it emerged from the Constitutional convention.
93. Wolfram, supra note 89, at 666.
94. Id.
95. One Federalist argued, "[I]t appears to me it was infinitely better, rather than
endanger everything by attempting too much, to leave this complicated business of detail to
the regulation of the future Legislature, where it can be adjusted coolly and at ease, and upon
full and exact information." 1 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 86, at 454.
96. See id. at 455. Federalist James Iredell of North Carolina, a prominent attorney later
appointed to the Supreme Court, answered the objections by George Mason, author of the
Virginia Declaration of Rights and leader of the fight for a federal bill of rights, as follows:
It is in the power of the Parliament, if they dare to exercise it, to abolish the trial
by jury altogether. But woe be to the man who should dare to attempt it. It would
undoubtedly produce an insurrection, that would hurl every tyrant to the ground
who attempted to destroy that great and just favorite of the English nation. We
certainly shall be always sure of this guard at least upon any such act of folly or
insanity in our representative.
Id.
97. THE FEDERALsT No. 83 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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room to suppose that future experience may discover the pro-
priety and utility of other exceptions. I suspect it to be impossible
in the nature of the thing, to fix the salutary point at which the
operation of the institution ought to stop; and this is with me a
strong argument for leaving the matter to the discretion of the
legislature. 8
The exclusion of the jury trial provision, as well as the lack of
a bill of rights, spurred Anti-Federalist opposition to the Constitu-
tion." The objections of the Anti-Federalists did not go unnoticed.
In order to muster majority support at the ratifying conventions, the
Federalists had to promise that certain provisions recommended by
the states would be added immediately after adoption of the Consti-
tution; among the provisions promised was one providing the right
to a jury trial in civil cases.'0
Edith Henderson, in her study of the debates, suggests that the
Anti-Federalists based their desire for a jury trial guaranty on
"nothing more specific than the general proposition that civil juries
were a good thing."'' She argues that, considering the diversity of
procedures employed in the states, one should not view the amend-
ment as an attempt to codify a rigid form of jury practice. After
discussing the procedural devices available at that time by which
questions of the sufficiency of the evidence could be taken from the
jury and reserved for the court's consideration, she writes that "it
seems both unnecessary and undesirable to read that amendment
as imposing any but the most general limitations on the Court's
power to make . . .procedural changes" in the interests of effi-
ciency.' 02 Thus, the power of the judge to grant summary judgments,
judgments n.o.v. and new trials does not necessarily reduce the
power of civil juries to such an extent that the use of those proce-
dures violates the seventh amendment. "The whole thrust of the
98. Id. at 573. Hamilton was addressing the foreseeable limitations on the jury trial.
Even in the late eighteenth century he could perceive instances in which a jury would be the
inappropriate factfinder. He expressed concern about freezing the right in a particular provi-
sion. Hamilton's concern was justified, for the Supreme Court later used the static historical
analysis to freeze the amendment. Of course, the Court subsequently modified the jury trial
guaranty to adapt it to modern procedures, but the change generally resulted only in an
expansion of the right to jury trial. Perhaps Hamilton would agree that complex litigation
should never be heard by a jury. Perhaps the Court's refashioning of the traditional historical
test in Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970), is an adoption of Hamilton's perspective toward
the jury trial right. See notes 163-69 and accompanying text infra.
99. See Wolfram, supra note 89, at 662.
100. Henderson, supra note 89, at 298.
101. Id. at 292.
102. Id. at 337. The Supreme Court generally has followed this interpretation of the
amendment. Id. at 336.
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history of jury practice," she writes, "both before and after 1790, has
been toward rationality of decision and economy of motion in the
courtroom."'0 3
Although Henderson's analysis implies that existing procedural
devices limiting the role of the jury in civil cases define the outer
boundaries of permissible modifications under the seventh amend-
ment, her reasoning could conceivably be expanded to allow modifi-
cation even of the jury's factfinding role where, due to the jurors'
inability to understand the facts, their decisions would be irrational
and would undermine the efficacy of the judicial method of dispute
settlement.
Professor Wolfram, on the other hand, argues that historical
materials evidence specific reasons advanced by proponents of the
seventh amendment'"' for the inclusion of a jury trial guaranty: the
frustration of unwise legislation; the overturning of the practices of
courts of vice-admiralty; the vindication of the interests of private
citizens in government litigation; and, the protection of litigants
against overbearing and oppressive judges.05 Most importantly, he
asserts that juries were intentionally thrust into cases in order to
effect a result different from the decision of an honest judge sitting
without a jury. Supporters of the amendment meant for juries sit-
ting in civil cases to act as a "check on what the popular mind might
regard as legislative as well as judicial excesses."'"
103. Id. at 336-37.
104. Wolfram, supra note 89, at 670-71. For instance, Patrick Henry, a representative
spokesman of the Anti-Federalists, based his plea on a strong emotional attachment to an
institution which had developed in England to curtail governmental oppression.
Why do we love this trial by jury? Because it prevents the hand of oppression
from cutting you off. They may call any thing rebellion, and deprive you of a fair
trial by an impartial jury of your neighbors. Has not your mother country mag-
nanimously preserved this noble privilege upwards of a thousand years? Did she
relinquish a jury of the vicinage because there was a possibility of resistance to
oppression? She has been magnanimous enough to resist every attempt to take
away this privilege.
2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 86, at 810.
105. Wolfram, supra note 89, at 670-71. Wolfram sets out a caveat indicating the metho-
dological constraints one faces when studying this subject and relying on history. First, the
original understanding can be perceived only imperfectly, particularly with the absence of
records of debate. Second, "no decent theory of constitutional thought or adjudication can
afford to give totally controlling weight to the product of historical method alone. The risks
of inaccuracy inherent in historical work are too great." Id. at 652.
106. Id. at 653. Wolfram concludes:
The inconveniences of jury trial were accepted precisely because in important
instances, through its ability to disregard substantive rules of law, the jury would
reach a result that the judge either could not or would not reach. Those who
favored the civil jury were not misguided tinkerers with procedural devices; they
were, for the day, libertarians who avowed that important areas of protection for
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Wolfram also asserts that the history of the political settlement
achieved between Federalists and Anti-Federalists suggests that the
term "common law" was intended to refer to a process of legal
development, rather than a changeless state of the law. Therefore,
according to Wolfram, the seventh amendment should be read as
referring to the common law process of adjudication and lawmaking
that was recognized in England and is recognized in the United
States as flexible and changing. Wolfram terms this a "dynamic"
reading of the seventh amendment. 7 He maintains that this ap-
proach is most consistent with the "traditions of principled consti-
tutionalism" the Supreme Court has used to interpret other Bill of
Rights guaranties. 8 The static historical test, however, not only
makes the right to jury trial dependent upon reference to the laws
of England, but also limits interpretation of the amendment to a
1791 reading.' After extensive investigation, Wolfram concludes:
[T]he division between law and equity is not maintainable on
any category of differences that can support even a pragmatically
based constitutional distinction between the two. The only juris-
prudential support for the varying command of the Constitution
with respect to law and equity cases thus is reduced to the histori-
cal accident that in 1791 some kinds of cases were, for reasons
that had nothing or at least little to do with the mode of adjudica-
tion, triable in courts that had no juries."0
Using this interpretation of the historical material as his basic
premise, Wolfram suggests a "functional" approach to the interpre-
tation of the seventh amendment."' Applying his "functional" ap-
proach, a court would first analyze the "reasons" given by the Anti-
Federalists for the necessity of a constitutionally guaranteed right
to jury trial. It would then grant a jury in all civil cases unless a
litigant could demonstrate "either that the threats the jury was to
meet in 1791 are today insufficiently important to require the con-
stitutional solution of mandatory jury trial or that the jury in fact
. . .no longer performs, the function ascribed to it by the origina-
litigants in general, and for debtors in particular, would be placed in grave danger
unless it were required that juries sit in civil cases.
Id. at 671-72 (footnote omitted). It is interesting to note that Wolfram's conclusions parallel
the five advantages of the jury system stated by Holdsworth. See notes 28-31 and accompany-
ing text supra.
107. Wolfram, supra note 89, at 745.
108. Id. at 731.
109. Id. at 641-42.
110. Id. at 731 (footnote omitted).
111. Id. at 718.
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tors of the seventh amendment.""'
Courts have generally abandoned the static historical test,
recognizing that historical categorization alone is an inadequate test
of the scope of the right to jury trial. Therefore, Wolfram appears
to have ample support for his dynamic interpretation. Wolfram's
"functional" approach, however, does not result in the contraction
of the jury trial right in complex litigation that is advocated in this
article. Wolfram writes:
The dynamic approach to the seventh amendment would
therefore reject the notion that the guarantee of jury trial should
be determined by reference to matters of trial convenience or the
relative "difficulty" of the legal or factual issues in the case. To
the contrary, the alleged difficulty of issues in a case might argue
more strongly than otherwise for the intervention of a jury, for
this would permit some form of public scrutiny of the proceedings
in order to assure that the "justice" of the case is not permitted
to be lost in the maze."3
It is conceded that Wolfram might be correct in his assertion
that the Anti-Federalists had specific reasons for requiring a jury in
civil trials. It is also conceded that a jury might be necessary to
protect litigants from governmental oppression by infusing into the
judicial decision communal concepts of justice and fairness. The
problem with Wolfram's "functional" analysis is that it fails to take
into account the jury's most important historical func-
tion-factfinding.
Thus, while the concerns of the Anti-Federalists might still be
valid considerations, they must be viewed in the context of the
jury's factfinding abilities. It is unlikely that a jury incapable of
understanding the facts in a complex case would be equipped to
interject equities into the case in the nonarbitrary fashion mandated
both by the traditional notions of due process and the functional
historical test advocated in this section.
B. Development of the Jury System During the Colonial Period
Wolfram asserts that the static historical test is flawed because
it only incorporates the practices of English common law."' This
appears to be correct, and the functional historical test thus in-
cludes consideration of the development of the American jury sys-
tem in the years following the adoption of the amendment.
112. Id. at 672 n.88.
113. Id. at 746-47.
114. Id. at 720-22.
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During the first thirty years of the new republic, the legal pro-
fession rose "from its chaotic condition of around 1790 to a position
of political and intellectual domination" in the 1830's."1 This domi-
nation was made possible primarily by the unification of legal and
commercial interest during that period."'
By 1880, the mainstay of commercial practice was marine in-
surance litigation between merchants and insurance companies." 7
The most significant outgrowth of this practice was the develop-
ment of three procedural devices used to restrict the scope of the
jury's role in deciding cases."18 This section will focus on these proce-
dural changes and their effect on the jury's function. Many of the
conclusions 'reached herein are premised on information found in
Morton J. Horwitz' The Transformation of American Law. "s9
One of the major procedural changes made during the last years
of the eighteenth century was the expansion by American lawyers
of the "special case" or "case reserved." The device was designed
to avoid the effective intervention of a jury by submitting points of
law directly to the judge. This procedure enabled judges to develop
a body of common law from what originally had been merchant
custom.121
A second important procedural change was the expansion of the
practice of awarding new trials when juries reached verdicts con-
trary to the weight of the evidence. This practice had been viewed
suspiciously by the revolutionary generation, but became popular
by the nineteenth century. In fact, the practice was eventually ex-
panded to allow reversal of jury verdicts contrary to the weight of
the evidence, which significantly increased the judge's "arsenal" of
devices by which to control the jury. This change in policy, for which
there was no apparent precedent, was first used in commercial
cases.1
2'
115. M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 140 (1977)
(quoting P. MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL
WAR 109 (1965)).
116. Id. at 140.
117. Id. at 141.
118. Id. at 141-42.
119. Id. I recognize that reliance on secondary sources would be insufficient if I were
writing a strictly historical piece, but it is not necessary for the purposes of this paper to delve
more deeply into primary historical sources. Nonetheless, Horwitz' explanations of the rela-
tionship between legal and commercial interests and the resultant procedural changes are
particularly relevant to this article because some of the most complex litigation of the colonial
period arose out of commercial transactions.
120. In New York, this procedure supplanted traditional practice, while in Massachu-
setts, cases submitted to its Supreme Judicial Court generally proceeded from an agreed
statement of facts. Id. at 142.
121. Id.
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The third procedural change restricting the power of the jury
was the advancement by the bar of the view that there was a sharp
distinction between law and fact. Jurists at the end of the eight-
eenth century believed that the jury was the proper judge of both
law and fact.lu By the 1800's, however, a judge's instruction on the
law became mandatory to a jury, rather than advisory, in several
important commercial jurisdictions.r2 Horwitz concludes: "These
procedural changes made possible a vast ideological transformation
in the attitude of American jurists toward commercial law. The
subjugation of juries was necessary not only to control particular
verdicts but also to develop a uniform and predictable body of
judge-made commercial rules.'1 2'
To summarize, these procedural modifications increased the
role of the judiciary in commercial affairs because they facilitated
the development of uniform, judge-made commercial laws. Accord-
ingly, the use and availability of extralegal forms of dispute settle-
ment diminished.
25
During this period, jurists also witnessed the rapid demise of
the "struck" or special jury, which had been a favorite of colonial
merchants.12 Throughout the colonial period, until about 1800, this
device ensured that merchants would be used as jurors in deciding
mercantile causes. Around that time, the New York Legislature
122. The reader should recall that one of the reasons the authors of the Constitution were
unable to settle on a specific provision for the civil jury trial was that methods for allocating
between judge and jury the responsibility for deciding questions of law and of fact were
different in the various states. See Henderson, supra note 89, at 299.
123. M. HoRwrrz, supra note 115, at 143.
124. Id. It is apparent that judges thought that allowing jurors to decide cases
where they were unable to understand the intricacies of commercial law or the factual evi-
dence put before them would not have permitted the development of a body of law that had
uniformity and predictability. Horwitz reports that "the influence of Lord Mansfield's con-
ception of a 'general jurisprudence' of commercial law became overwhelming in America after
1790." Id.
125. The use of arbitration was widespread among commercial interests during the colo-
nial period when it was unregulated by courts. It fell into disfavor, however, at the end of
the eighteenth century, because courts no longer considered its determinations binding. Id.
at 145-55.
Horwitz attributes the change in attitude of judges and merchants toward commercial
arbitration to several factors. First, the legal profession had become determined to oppose
antilegalism among merchants. Second, the mercantile classes which had previously found
colonial legal rules hostile to their interests now found that common law judges were prepared
to overturn anticommercial legal concepts. Third, the development of a split in commercial
interests converted a largely self-regulating merchant group into one that was made depen-
dent upon formal legal machinery to regulate its factions. "Thus, one might loosely describe
the process as one of accommodation by which merchants were induced to submit to formal
legal regulation in return for a major transformation of substantive legal rules governing
commercial disputes." Id. at 154.
126. Id. at 155. See notes 64-72 and accompanying text supra.
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passed a statute denying the struck jury as a matter of right. Al-
though the statute did not completely prohibit the use of struck
juries, Horwitz found no reports of cases submitted to a struck jury
after 1807.1" Horwitz' study indicates that, due to disintegration of
the mercantile class, merchant jurors no longer provided uniform
rules of practice; therefore, commercial law began to fall within the
exclusive province of the judiciary.'
Horwitz' findings tie together several important points that
should be considered in light of the preceding discussions on the
development of the jury system in England and the seventh amend-
ment's inclusion in the Bill of Rights. First, the colonists' use of the
struck jury was a carryover from the right to a special jury in com-
mon law suits in England. The special jury served two functions in
the colonial period: Its use allowed merchants to participate in the
creation of laws by which they would be governed and provided a
competent factfinder. When circumstances changed, and it became
clear that the judiciary was better equipped to develop a body of
commercial law that ensured more predictable and impartial re-
sults, the special jury's role in developing the law was phased out.
Horwitz' data offers a judge faced with complex litigation two
historical reasons to deny a motion for jury trial. First, Horwitz
suggests that the colonists originally accepted the English notion
that the special jury was an essential element of the right to jury
trial in commerical litigation. The special jury in both countries
served the function of providing an impartial adjudicator with so-
phistication and understanding of commercial problems. Those
commercial cases are, in many respects, analogous to today's com-
plex litigation suits. Thus, if the purpose of the jury system was to
find the truth, and if historically that purpose could be attained
127. M. HoRwrrz, supra note 115, at 156.
128. Id. at 158. The incorporation of marine insurance companies was a departure from
the traditional self-insurance plans of the New York commercial community. The result was
that accepted rules of insurance law came under attack and the interests of the commercial
class and the insurance community diverged. Merchants found that the anticorporate bias
of the regular jury *as more to their advantage than a special jury of merchants. In addition,
the judiciary began to recognize that special juries of merchants were not conducting their
factfinding in an impartial fashion. See Barnewall v. Church, 1 Cai. R'. 217 (N.Y. 1803),
quoted in M. HORwrrz, supra note 115, at 156-57, in which the verdict of a merchant jury
was overridden. Judge Radcliff wrote: "The circumstance that here was a struck jury is not
of decisive weight in favor of the verdict, especially as it is founded on a point against which,
as a ground of defence, it is known considerable prejudice exists." 1 Cai. R., at 243.
Although removal of the special jury did not result in complete elimination of a jury, the
actions of the New York court are consistent with the functional analysis and with the due
process model advocated here. When the special jury no longer served its historical function
as an impartial adjudicator, it was abandoned by the court and the legislature.
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only by using a special jury in commercial cases, then unless such
a jury can be assembled today in complex litigation, the jury trial
can no longer serve its purpose.
Second, when the special jury ceased to perform its function as
an impartial factfinder, it was abandoned in the United States.
Moreover, despite the revolutionary fervor that resulted in the in-
clusion of the seventh amendment in the Bill of Rights, the colonial
judiciary sharply curtailed the jury's role in commercial litigation
in order to develop a uniform body of law. Although this judicial
activity did not eliminate the jury entirely, a court today could
arguably conclude, on the basis of a similar functional approach,
that a modern jury unable to perform its historical function (as an
impartial adjudicator capable of understanding the facts) may con-
stitutionally be removed from complex litigation.
IV. THE EARLY CASE LAW
Prior to the merger of law and equity, the courts' approach to
interpreting the seventh amendment was relatively simple. To de-
termine whether a right to jury trial was guaranteed, a judge would
ask whether the suit was heard at common law in 1791. This ap-
proach is called the static historical test; it was created by Mr.
Justice Story's definition of the phrase "common law" in the land-
mark decision of Parsons v. Bedford.'
By common law, [framers of the seventh amendment] meant
what the constitution denominated in the third article "law;" not
merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old
and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to
be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those,
where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable rem-
edies were administered . . . .In a just sense, the amendment
then may well be construed to embrace all suits, which are not
of equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may be the pecu-
liar form which they may assume to settle legal rights.'
Except for one refinement made toward the end of the nine-
teenth century, this definition was strictly adhered to until the
merger of law and equity. After examining the historical evidence,
the Supreme Court, in Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 3' concluded
that the framers "had in view the rules of the common law of Eng-
land, and not the rules of that law as modified by local statute or
129. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830).
130. Id. at 446.
131. 174 U.S. 1 (1898).
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usage in any of the States.' ' 2
Mr. Justice Van Devanter embedded this refined static histori-
cal test firmly into legal doctrine by his opinion in Baltimore &
Carolina Line v. Redman. i3 The language in that opinion reiterated
the belief that the right of trial by jury was that which existed under
English common law at the time of the amendment's adoption. Mr.
Justice Van Devanter further froze interpretation by adding that
the amendment not only protected the right to jury trial, but also
disclosed a purpose to protect it from impairment due to expansion
of the judge's power to reexamine the jury's findings of fact or any
other change in the common law distinction between findings of law
and findings of fact."'
The static historical test did not, however, bind the federal
courts to the exact procedural incidents of jury trial at common law
in 1791. This conclusion was reached in Galloway v. United
States,"5 a post-merger decision, but one which did not involve the
complicated problems that merger created.' 6 The petitioner in
Galloway had alleged that the directed verdict deprived him of his
seventh amendment right to jury trial. The Court found that many
procedural practices had been in a state of flux and had not reached
any precise or final form in 1791.11 The Court recognized "the un-
certainty and the variety of conclusion which follows from an effort
at purely historical accuracy;""' nevertheless, it held "that the
Amendment was designed to preserve the basic institution of jury
trial in only its most fundamental elements, not the great mass of
procedural forms and details, varying even then so widely among
common-law jurisdictions."'
The Court also applied the static historical test to delimit the
scope of the right to a jury in a statutory proceeding. In NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,"I the National Labor Relations
Board had ordered the reinstatement of some employees and di-
rected that they be paid for the time lost by the discharge. The
corporation appealed the Board's decision, claiming, inter alia, that
the back pay award was equivalent to a money judgment and there-
fore it was entitled to a jury trial on that issue. The Court upheld
132. Id. at 8.
133. 295 U.S. 654 (1935).
134. Id. at 657.
135. 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
136. See notes 144-78 and accompanying text infra.
137. 319 U.S. 372, 391 (1943).
138. Id. at 392.
139. Id.
140. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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the Board, finding no right to jury trial existed where the recovery
of money damages was merely an incident of equitable relief. The
Court reasoned that unless the proceeding was in the nature of a suit
at common law in 1791, the amendment did not guarantee a trial
by jury. Because payment of back wages and reinstatement were
statutorily prescribed remedies, and an action to recover those rem-
edies was unknown at common law, the Court found no violation of
the corporation's seventh amendment rights."'
This brief summary of the leading cases in which the static
historical test was applied demonstrates how the earliest interpreta-
tions of the seventh amendment effectively limited substantive
rights to only those rights which had been conceived of in 1791. The
inconsistencies inherent in this interpretation are obvious. For in-
stance, an administrative body could order a private employer to
pay huge sums of money to his employees, characteristically legal
relief, yet the employer would have no right to a jury trial because
such proceedings did not exist in 1791.111
Even though courts eventually departed from the static histori-
cal test, the next section demonstrates that they did not abandon
historical analysis altogether."3 It is because of the continuing vital-
ity of historical analysis that the preceding sections of this article
were devoted to developing a proper historical test. That test, unlike
the static test, takes into account not only the types of cases in
which the jury actually participated in 1791, but also the function
served by the jury in those cases.
V. THE POST-MERGER CASES
The merger of law and equity removed many former jurisdic-
141. Id. at 48-49.
142. See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966). This suit involved alleged voidable
preferences under the Bankruptcy Act. Examining congressional intent, the Court concluded
that the jury trial claim was not applicable where there was a specific statutory scheme
providing for the prompt trial of disputed claims without a jury. Id. at 338-40.
Such was not the case with statutory remedies enforced by the court rather than by
administrative agencies. See Fleitman v. Welsbach Street Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916).
This three page Holmes opinion is the basis for rights to jury trial under the Sherman Act.,
Without examining legislative intent, Holmes concluded "that when a penalty of triple dam-
ages is sought to be inflicted, the statute should not be read as attempting to authorize
liability to be enforced otherwise than through the verdict of a jury in a court of common
law." Id. at 29. See also Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). Black, citing
Fleitman, there held that the right to trial by jury applies to treble damage suits under the
antitrust laws, and is, in fact, an essential part of the congressional plan for making competi-
tion, rather than monopoly, the rule of trade. Id. at 504.
143. See notes 145-47 and accompanying text infra. The Ross Court incorporates histori-
cal analysis as the first prong of its test.
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tional limitations created by differences in procedures and reme-
dies,' but distinctions between the two systems remained impor-
tant when litigants demanded jury trials in suits combining legal
and equitable claims. The merged procedures created numerous
analytical problems for courts attempting to apply a static histori-
cal test to determine whether an action was legal or equitable for
jury trial purposes. As a result, the Supreme Court, in several im-
portant decisions," 5 abandoned that test and developed a more
functional analysis.'
The first decision moving toward a functional analysis was Mr.
Justice Black's opinion in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover. 7 Fox,
the operator of a movie theatre, had negotiated contracts with
movie distributors which granted him the exclusive right to show
"first run" pictures within his competitive area and provided for
"clearance," a period of time during which competing theatres
could not exhibit the same pictures. After building a drive-in thea-
tre eleven miles away, Beacon notified Fox that it considered the
contracts overt violations of the antitrust laws. Fox sought an in-
junction that would prevent Beacon from instituting threatening
treble damage actions against him and a declaration that the clear-
ances were reasonable and not violative of the antitrust laws. Bea-
con counterclaimed, asserting that the clearances were unreasona-
ble for lack of substantial competition"' between the two theatres,
and sought treble damages from Fox for conspiring to restrain trade
and monopolize first-run pictures.
The district court viewed the issues raised by the complaint as
essentially equitable and directed that Fox's claim for injunctive
relief be tried to the court prior to a jury determination of the anti-.
trust violations. Because the competition issue common to both
claims would necessarily be determined in the equitable trial, Bea-
con would be collaterally estopped from relitigating that issue in the
144. See generally F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 356-59 (2d ed. 1977). James
argues that formerly, the rational allocation of issues between jurisdictions was often dictated
by a factor other than jury trial. For example, a chancellor facing witness credibility problems
could send the issue to a law court and jury to evaluate demeanor evidence. Similarly, where
an accounting required the testimony of business associates, it was conducted in equity to
overcome their incompetency to testify at law. "[Jiury trial (or court trial) was often merely
the tail of the dog under a system where you had to take the whole dog." Id. at 358.
145. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S.
469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
146. The Court has continued to use a more traditional historical test when confronted
with statutorily created rights. See notes 179-213 and accompanying text infra.
147. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
148. Significant precedents indicated that there should be no clearances between thea-
tres not in substantial competition. See id. at 502 n.1.
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jury trial of its treble damage claim. Despite this result, the court
of appeals upheld, under the clean-up doctrine, the district court's
discretion as to sequence of trial."'
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that even if Fox had
properly invoked equitable jurisdiction, the district court was re-
quired to preserve Beacon's constitutional right to trial by jury of
all the issues in the antitrust controversy. The Court stated that the
district court's exercise of its discretion to try equitable claims prior
to legal ones should have been based on the traditional grounds for
granting equitable relief: a showing of irreparable harm and inade-
quacy of legal remedy. Mr. Justice Black opined that these were
practical tests, to be determined in light of remedies made available
by the Declaratory Judgment Act 5" and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 5' Expansion of legal remedies necessarily reduced the
need to invoke equitable jurisdiction. 52 If the new procedures would
not fully protect an equity plaintiff from irreparable harm during
the jury trial, then the order of trial would be discretionary. The
Court did not believe Fox had presented such a case. "[O]nly
under the most imperative circumstances, circumstances which in
view of the flexible procedures of the Federal Rules we cannot now
anticipate, can the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through
prior determination of equitable claims.' 53
149. Id. at 505. The clean-up doctrine is an equitable doctrine that allows a court of
equity which has obtained jurisdiction over a portion of a controversy to proceed to determine
the entire controversy and award complete relief, regardless of whether legal rights are in-
volved. For a description of the equitable clean-up doctrine, see D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.7
(1973); 1 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 181-83, 231-42 (5th ed. 1941); Levin,
Equitable Clean-up and the Jury: A Suggested Orientation, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 320 (1951).
150. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1958).
151. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 507 (1959). Mr. Justice Black
continued:
[T]he justification for equity's deciding legal issues once it obtains jurisdiction,
and refusing to dismiss a case, merely because subsequently a legal remedy be-
comes available, must be re-evaluated in the light of the liberal joinder provisions
of the Federal Rules which allow legal and equitable causes to be brought and
resolved in one civil action.
Id. at 509 (footnote omitted).
152. Id. at 509. See McCoid, Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A Study of
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1967). McCoid argues that by
permitting an inverted and accelerated adjudication of Beacon's right to legal relief, the
declaratory judgment was a legal remedy made available through procedural reform which
eliminated the necessity for equitable intervention. Such reasoning
alters the jury trial result reached on the basis of a purely historical inquiry, even
where merger is not a consideration. It cements the view that Beacon requires the
right to jury trial to be measured in the light of procedural reform. And it opens
to inquiry whether other procedural reform may not affect right to jury trial.
Id. at 6-7.
153. 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959) (footnote omitted).
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It is important to note that the expansion in Beacon of the right
to jury trial signified a striking recession from historical precedent
because it allowed the jury to decide cases it could not have heard
in 1791, since there were no similar procedures available at law at
that time. The Court, considering the jury's capabilities as a factfin-
der in light of these new procedures, could perceive no reason to
deny a jury determination of the issues in Beacon.
The commentators generally agreed'54 that Beacon was a depar-
ture from the static historical test,'55 and they enthusiastically ac-
cepted the departure as an expansion of the right to jury trial.," It
is doubtful, however, that they would have been so generally recep-
tive to a suggestion that the same functional analysis could also be
used to contract the right to a jury.157
The Court moved further from the static historical test in Dairy
Queen, Inc. v. Wood.55 In that case, a trademark owner alleged
breach in the payment of a licensing contract and infringement due
to defendant licensee's continuing use of the trademark after notice
of cancellation. In light of defendant's continuing infringement and
unstable financial condition, plaintiff alleged the threat of irrepara-
ble injury for which he had no adequate remedy at law. The plaintiff
pled for injunctive relief and an accounting, both remedies histori-
cally heard only in equity.
Mr. Justice Black, writing for four members of the Court, re-
characterized the accounting claim as a legal claim for a money
judgment. He refused to permit the constitutional right to jury trial
"to depend upon the choice of words used in the pleadings."' 5
As in Beacon, the availability of equitable relief in Dairy Queen
depended upon the absence of an adequate legal remedy. Conse-
quently, in this case involving a contract action cognizable at law,
the plaintiff would not be entitled to an equitable accounting absent
a showing that the accounts between the parties were of such a
complicated nature that only a court of equity could unravel them.
Mr. Justice Black noted that the burden of such a showing would
154. See McCoid, supra note 152, at 6; Note, Congressional Provision for Nonjury Trial
under the Seventh Amendment, 83 YALE L.J. 401, 408 (1973).
155. See F. JAMES, CML PROCEDURE 347 (1st ed. 1965). James argues for an elastic
construction of the historical test by the courts in order to accommodate further shifts similar
to those continually taking place in the period of history when the seventh amendment was
adopted.
156. See McCoid, supra note 152, at 24.
157. Some commentators did make that suggestion. See, e.g., Kane, Civil Jury Trial:
The Case for Reasoned Iconoclasm, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 2 n.5 (1976).
158. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
159. Id. at 478.
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rarely be met in view of the court's power under federal rule 53(b)
to appoint a maqter to assist the jury in handling exceptionally
complicated legal issues. 60
Consistent with his functional analysis in Beacon, Mr. Justice
Black stated that the use of a master to assist in accounting situa-
tions was a procedural change affecting the right to jury trial.
Though an accounting was traditionally an equitable remedy, if a
master could enable the jury to unravel the complexities of an ac-
counting, the remedy at law would no longer be inadequate, and a
jury trial should be granted. "' In other words, procedural reform
made the jury an adequate factfinder and thus the remedy at law
was adequate. Dairy Queen is important not only for this departure
from the static historical test, but also for the exception it carves
out of its jury trial mandate. Though Mr. Justice Black believed
that only in rare circumstances would legal issues be too compli-
cated for a jury to handle with the aid of a master, he conceded that
the possibility might exist. This "Dairy Queen exception" effec-
tively conceded that in such circumstances, the practical abilities
and limitations of juries must be considered in a functional analysis,
foreshadowing the third prong of the jury trial test formulated in
Rose v. Bernard. 2
The Supreme Court's decision in Ross represents the furthest
move from a historical test toward a pure functional analysis of the
right to jury trial. The Ross plaintiffs, stockholders in a closed end
investment company, brought a shareholders' derivative action
against the company's directors and investment brokers, claiming
damages for injury sustained due to the payment of allegedly exces-
sive brokerage commissions. Although a shareholders' suit on behalf
of the corporation historically could be brought only in equity,'6 3 the
Court refused to apply the static historical analysis or to view the
suit as a unitary, equitable cause of action.
Pointing out the dual nature of the derivative action, the major-
ity separated the shareholders' initial claim to speak for the corpora-
tion, from the merits of the corporation's claim, which would have
160. Id. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b) provides:
A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule. In actions to
be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only when the issues are complicated;
in actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of account and of difficult
computation of damages, a reference shall be made only upon a showing that
some exceptional condition requires it.
161. See McCoid, supra note 152, at 8-9; Comment, The Seventh Amendment-A Re-
turn to Fundamentals, 10 URB. L. ANN. 313, 315 n.14 (1975).
162. 396 U.S. 531 (1970). See notes 163-67 and accompanying text infra.
163. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 544 n.4 (1970) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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been tried to a jury had the corporation sued in its own right. Rather
than attempt to characterize the overall action, the Court held that
the "Seventh Amendment question depends on the nature of the
issue to be tried rather than the character of the overall action.""'
Ross was a dramatic departure from Beacon and Dairy Queen,
which had involved a combination'of historically separable suits,
one in law and one in equity."' In those cases, the order of the
proceedings may have been changed, but the nature of the suits
remained the same. As Mr. Justice Stewart pointed out in his dis-
sent, the Ross suit was not a combination of legal and equitable
claims:
Since, as the court concedes, a shareholder's derivative suit could
be brought only in equity, it would seem to me to follow by the
most elementary logic that in such suits there is no constitutional
right to a trial by jury. Today the Court tosses aside history, logic,
and over 100 years of firm precedent to hold that the plaintiff in
a shareholder's derivative suit does indeed have a constitutional
right to a trial by jury. This holding has a questionable basis in
policy and no basis whatever in the Constitution."'
Nevertheless, after separating the two claims, the majority laid
out three factors (the Ross test) for determining whether an issue
was legal, rather than equitable.
As our cases indicate, the "legal" nature of an issue is deter-
mined by considering, first, the pre-merger custom with reference
to such questions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the
practical abilities and limitations of juries. Of these factors, the
first, requiring extensive and possibly abstruse historical inquiry,
is obviously the most difficult to apply."'
It is the third factor in the Ross test that is of particular signifi-
cance. Besides diminishing the importance of the static historical
test, the Court recognized that a jury's limitations could be suffi-
cient to send a legal remedy into equity. It is the third factor that
the courts have relied on to deny the jury trial demand in complex
164. Id. at 538 (footnote omitted).
165. Id. at 549 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 544-45 (footnotes omitted). Stewart included the following footnote:
Certainly there is no consensus among commentators on the desirability of jury
trials in civil actions generally. Particularly where the issues in the case are
complex-as they are likely to be in a derivative suit-much can be said for
allowing the court discretion to try the case itself. See discussion in 5 J. Moore,
Federal Practice 38.02[1].
Id. at 545 n.5.
167. Id. at 538 n.1O.
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litigation."I
In Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, "I the Supreme Court demon-
strated that, in addition to expanding the right to jury trial because
of post-merger procedural changes, it would rely upon post-merger
modifications of procedural doctrines to deny a request for jury trial.
The Court there concluded that a private plaintiff could use an SEC
judgment returned in a prior equitable action to estop the relitiga-
tion of the same issues before a jury in a subsequent legal action.
Petitioner Parklane had argued that because the scope of the sev-
enth amendment must be determined by reference to the common
law as it existed in 1791, and since the common law permitted
collateral estoppel only where there was mutuality of parties,7 ' col-
lateral estoppel could not constitutionally be applied to deny the
right to jury trial absent such mutuality.1
7
1
After deciding the threshold issue regarding offensive use of
collateral estoppel,' the Court considered whether such use would
violate Parklane's right to jury trial. Writing for the majority of
eight Justices, Mr. Justice Stewart' noted that the Courts in both
Beacon Theatres and Katchen v. Landy 7' had recognized that an
equitable determination could have a collateral estoppel effect in a
subsequent legal action.'75 Observing that procedural devices devel-
168. See notes 238-69 and accompanying text infra.
169. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
170. The doctrine of mutuality of parties directed that neither party could use a prior
judgment as an estoppel against the other unless both parties were bound by the judgment.
Id. at 326-27. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S.
313 (1971); Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d
892 (1942).
171. 439 U.S. at 335-36.
172. Collateral estoppel is used "offensively" when "a plaintiff [seeks] to estop a defen-
dant from relitigating the issues which the defendant previously litigated and lost against
another plaintiff." "Defensive" use occurs when a plaintiff is "estopped from asserting a
claim [which he] had previously litigated and lost against another defendant." Id. at 329.
The Parklane Court abandoned the mutuality doctrine and held that permission to use
collateral estoppel offensively was within the trial court's discretion, to be denied in cases
where a plaintiff could easily have joined the defendant in the earlier action or where its use
would be unfair to a defendant for other reasons. Id. at 331.
The Court apparently ignored the potential effect of its decision on the incentive struc-
ture of litigants in SEC enforcement actions. Parklane greatly enhances the SEC's ability to
coerce settlements: litigants will be fearful that unless they settle, factual determinations
will be used against them in subsequent private actions.
173. Mr. Justice Stewart's authorship of the majority opinion is particularly interesting,
considering his dissents in the cases expanding the jury trial right. To observe how he pruned
Beacon to a "general prudential rule," see note 175 infra.
174. 382 U.S. 323 (1966). See notes 194-98 and accompanying text infra.
175. 439 U.S. at 334-35. Mr. Justice Stewart opined that Beacon enunciated no more
than a general prudential rule which guided the trial court's limited discretion as to sequence
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oped subsequent to 1791 had diminished the historic domain of the
civil jury trial, the Court cited Galloway v. United States76 for
support in its holding that judgment in a prior equitable action
could be used to stop relitigation of the same issues in a legal action:
The law of collateral estoppel, like the law in other proce-
dural areas defining the scope of the jury's function, has evolved
since 1791. Under the rationale of the Galloway case, these devel-
opments are not repugnant to the Seventh Amendment simply
for the reason that they did not exist in 1791. Thus if, as we have
held, the law of collateral estoppel forecloses the petitioners from
relitigating the factual issues determined against them in the
SEC action, nothing in the Seventh Amendment dictates a differ-
ent result, even though because of lack of mutuality there would
have been no collateral estoppel in 1791.'11
The Court in Parklane, as it had in previous cases, modified the
seventh amendment right in light of procedural changes in the law.
It is clear that the seventh amendment should not be frozen into a
static historical position. The particular significance of Parklane is
its indication of the Court's willingness to contract as well as expand
the jury trial right.
Just as prescribed in the functional historical approach advo-
cated in this article, the Parklane Court looked to the jury's function
as factfinder. Because all common issues of fact had been resolved
in the previous SEC litigation, no factfinding function remained to
be performed; thus, there was no need for a jury, and the Court's
refusal to allow relitigation of the issues before a jury did not result
in a denial of the right to jury trial. 7 '
VI. STATUTORY CASES
Many of the most recent Supreme Court cases involving the
right to jury trial have arisen in the context of statutorily created
rights. In those cases, the Supreme Court has not only employed a
historical test, but has looked at congressional intent to determine
of trial in combined legal and equitable claims in order to preserve the right to jury trial from
the collateral estoppel effect of a prior equitable judgment.
176. 319 U.S. 372 (1943); see notes 135-39 and accompanying text supra.
177. 439 U.S. at 337 (footnote omitted).
178. This reading of Parklane emanates from Mr. Justice Stewart's hypothetical discus-
sion, id. at 335-36, to the effect that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes further
factfinding by any factfinder, be it judge or jury. Thus, Mr. Justice Stewart characterizes the
difference between trial by jury and trial to the court as "neutral." Id. at 332 n.19. Mr. Justice
Rehnquist dissented, arguing that trial by jury could lead to different results than trial by
judge. Rehnquist did not advocate rigid adherence to 1791 procedures; he merely opposed
procedural changes which would diminish the right to jury trial. Id. at 345-46.
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the litigants' jury trial rights. These cases do not, however, necessar-
ily represent a departure from the Court's development of a func-
tional analysis or any particular movement away from the Ross
test.' The decisions, as the following discussion indicates, should
not be interpreted as signifying that the Court abandoned the func-
tional analysis for determining the right to jury trial.
In Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Commission"" and Katchen v. Landy,5 ' the Supreme Court fo-
cused on the intent of Congress in setting up special tribunals to
decide cases arising under particular statutes with no provisions for
jury trials. In both cases, the Court upheld the lower court's denial
of a request for jury trial based on its perception of congressional
intent. The Court's rationale was that the use of the jury would
interfere with the functioning of the tribunal charged with enforcing
the statutory scheme. Arguably, the Court was considering the
jury's role as a factfinder and relying on a functional analysis rather
than a traditional historical test. A lay jury would be unable, the
Court believed, to provide either the expert' or summary'83 resolu-
179. Many lower federal courts have adopted the Ross test as a basis for analyzing the
litigant's rights to jury trial in statutory actions. The opinions in those cases deal primarily
with the first two prongs of that test. Most of the courts considered only briefly the practical
limitations on jurors' abilities as factfinders. See, e.g., Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2d 950 (4th
Cir. 1977) (jury trial granted in an action arising under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976)), aff'd, 434 U.S. 575 (1978); Minnis v. UAW, 531 F.2d
850 (8th Cir. 1975) (action for breach of union's duty of fair representation analogized to
action on a contract and not beyond a jury's ability to decide); Mosely v. National Fin. Co.,
440 F. Supp. 621 (M.D.N.C. 1977) (jury granted in action arising under Truth-in-Lending
Act); Wehr v. Borroughs Corp., 438 F. Supp. 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1977); General Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Watson-Bowman Assocs., 74 F.R.D. 139 (D. Del. 1977) (jury denied in patent infringe-
ment case); Mission Bay Campland, Inc. v. Sumner Fin. Corp., 72 F.R.D. 464 (M.D. Fla.
1976) (held issue of fraudulent transfer of assets for the jury to determine); Cleverly v.
Western Elec. Co., 69 F.R.D. 348 (1975).
In a few cases, however, courts have analyzed in detail the litigant's rights to a jury trial
under the third, (functional) prong of the Ross test. See, e.g., Jones v. Orenstein, 73 F.R.D.
604 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (jury granted in securities case because did not anticipate unreasonably
lengthy trial; no evidence court would be a superior factfinder); In re Boise Cascade Sec.
Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976) (jury denied due to complexity of evidence
and existence of varying legal standards to be applied to numerous parties).
180. 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
181. 382 U.S. 323 (1965).
182. The administrative agency involved in Atlas Roofing was intended to provide expert
resolution of factual issues by specialists in the area. 430 U.S. 442, 456 (1977). The Atlas
Roofing Court cited NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), and Block v.
Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921), as authority for the proposition that the purpose of an adminis-
trative agency is to provide an expert tribunal to resolve issues of fact which a lay jury could
not grasp quickly enough to decide in a reasonable time. The Court believed that a lay jury
would simply slow down the decisionmaking process by requiring lengthy explanation of
points the expert administrators already understood. 430 U.S. at 456. See Curtis v. Loether,
415 U.S. 189, 194 n.8 (1974).
183. A bankruptcy court allowed bankruptcy trustees to dispose summarily of the com-
plicated affairs of bankrupts' estates. See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 326-27 (1965).
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tion of factual issues the Court considered necessary to effect con-
gressional intent.
In Atlas Roofing, petitioners in two companion cases had re-
ceived orders to abate worksite hazards and notices of proposed
penalties from the Secretary of Labor. Inspectors from the Depart-
ment of Labor had discovered violations of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act'"' standards. In one of the two cases, the Secretary
imposed a $7,500 penalty which the petitioner contested. The Act
did not provide for a jury trial at any stage of the proceedings.'85 On
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,' petitioner
asserted that the Act violated his seventh amendment rights. The
majority nonetheless upheld the order, 87 although one dissenting
judge believed the petitioner's contention was correct.'88 In the com-
panion case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also upheld
the penalty and the abatement order.8 9
The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of both circuits. It
held that the government did not violate the seventh amendment
by collecting civil penalties in administrative proceedings so long as
the government was enforcing "public rights."'8 0 The Court cited
184. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
185. Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, inspectors representing the Secre-
tary of Labor have the authority to conduct reasonable safety inspections of workplaces. See
id. § 657(a) (1976). An inspector who discovers a violation of safety regulations may issue the
employer a citation ordering the employer to abate the hazard. The inspector may also fix a
civil penalty of as much as $10,000 for certain violations. Id. §§ 659(a), 666(a)-(c), 666(j). An
employer may contest the penalty only by notifying the Secretary. An administrative law
judge will then hold an evidentiary hearing. The full OSHA Review Commission may review
the findings. Either party may appeal the Commission's decision to an appropriate federal
court. Id. §§ 659, 660(a). Under id. § 660(a), "[tlhe findings of the Commission with respect
to questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole,
shall be conclusive."
186. Frank Frey Jr., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'r, 519 F.2d 1200
(3d Cir. 1975), affd sub. nom. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'r, 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
187. Id. at 1219.
188.. Id. at 1221-23. The dissent argued that to allow Congress unlimited authority to
delegate any subject it wished to an administrative agency would render the seventh amend-
ment meaningless. It was believed that the majority's rationale would always allow an admin-
istrative agency to deny a jury trial because any such agency could be deemed a special
"equitable" tribunal. Id. at 1222. See note 203 infra.
189. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'r, 518 F.2d 990,
1011 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
190. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'r, 430 U.S. at
450 (1977). The Court limited its holding to cases involving the enforcement of "public rights"
as opposed to "private rights." A private right is a right to enforce an obligation due an
individual or a private group. A public right, on the other hand, is a right of the government
to enforce an obligation due it. Id. at 450.
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precedent"' to the effect that jury trials were incompatible with the
procedures of an administrative agency and thus used a functional
analysis as one of its grounds for denying petitioner a jury trial.
The Court, in denying the request for jury trial in Atlas Roofing,
also used a modified functional historical analysis. It pointed out
that factfinding "was never the exclusive province of the jury under
either the English or American legal systems at the time of the
adoption of the Seventh Amendment; and the question whether a
fact would be found by a jury turned to a considerable degree on the
nature of the forum in which a litigant found himself."'"1 2 This prem-
ise led the Court to conclude that Congress could set up specialized
tribunals to enforce statutory rights as long as such tribunals could
more adequately resolve the issues than could a jury."3 The Court
implied that one could consider administrative proceedings equita-
ble in nature, because Congress set up such agencies to compensate
for procedural inadequacies in courts of law.
The Court's approach in Katchen v. Landy"' was somewhat
different, though it also led the Court to deny a jury trial request.
The Atlas Roofing Court seems to have derived this distinction from the case of Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856). In Murray's Lessee, the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of a summary procedure for collecting tax debts owed the
federal government. Under this procedure, executive officers could attach property in the
possession of a Collector of Customs without going to a court at any time.
The Court in Murray's Lessee admitted that such procedure would be subject to due
process and separation of powers objections if a private litigant could use it to collect a debt.
The Court, however, asserted that summary proceedings to collect debts owed the Crown were
usual under English common law. Id. at 278. Because the definition of "due process" came
from English common law, a summary proceeding similar to English proceedings to collect
debts owed the government would comply with due process. The Court also believed the
existence of English precedent countered the separation of powers argument. It held, there-
fore, that if Congress did not wish to use the courts to enforce public rights, it had the power
to delegate the enforcement of those rights to an executive official and authorize him to use
summary procedures. Id. at 284. If Congress chose to use an executive official to enforce a
public right, that official's findings of fact would be conclusive in any judicial review of the
legal issues which arose in the administrative proceeding. Id. at 285.
The Court in Atlas Roofing did not offer any policy reasons or constitutional theory to
support the distinction between "public" and "private" rights in modern administrative
proceedings. Nor did it indicate whether the sole criterion for distinguishing actions involving
public rights would be the identity of the plaintiff. It did not fully answer the reservations
expressed in the dissent from the Third Circuit decision. See note 188 supra.
191. E.g., Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937); see note 182 supra.
192. 430 U.S. at 458. The Court cited several cases to support this proposition. Among
them were Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 375-76 (1876) (condemnation suits could be
tried without a jury) and Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830) (existence of right
to a jury trial depends on the forum in which the litigant brings suit).
193. 430 U.S. at 460-61.
194. 382 U.S. 323 (1965).
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The issue in Katchen was whether a bankruptcy court had summary
jurisdiction to order the surrender of voidable preferences asserted
and proved by the trustee in response to a claim filed by the creditor
who had received the preferences. The creditor asserted on appeal
that he was entitled to a jury trial on the issue of the value of the
preference. The Court rejected that contention on several grounds.
First, the Court recognized that a primary purpose of the bank-
ruptcy laws was to secure the prompt settlement of bankrupt estates
without the burden of trials attended by unnecessary delay. Con-
gress chose summary disposition to effectuate that purpose and to
avoid the slower and more expensive processes of a plenary suit.' °
Second, the Court held that the Bankruptcy Act"' converted a cred-
itor's legal claim into an equitable claim. Because proceedings of
bankruptcy courts were inherently proceedings in equity, there was
no seventh amendment right to a jury trial.
The Court admitted that incidental questions frequently arose
in the course of bankruptcy proceedings which raised purely legal
issues. Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court, acting as an equity
court, could deal with those issues. This conclusion may seem incon-
sistent with the holdings in Beacon and Dairy Queen, but the Court
distinguished those decisions. It admitted that those decisions held
that all legal issues were to be tried to the jury unless the litigants
waived their jury trial rights, but "[iun neither Beacon Theatres
nor Dairy Queen was there involved a specific statutory scheme
contemplating the prompt trial of a disputed claim without the
intervention of a jury.""' Thus, the existence of a strong congres-
sional predisposition toward summary disposition of bankruptcy
cases, combined with the historical argument that all issues in an
equitable action could be tried to the judge, outweighed the value
of having a jury in this case."
In the Court's most recent statutory decision, Lorillard v.
Pons, "I it was able to avoid the constitutional cases altogether and
195. Id. at 328-29. A "plenary suit" under the bankruptcy laws is the procedure the
trustee must use to recover property the bankrupt had transferred to a preferred creditor
before bankruptcy. Under 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(8)(c) (1968), the bankruptcy courts and state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction of such a suit. A plenary suit regularly involves elaborate
procedural mechanisms such as trial by jury. See id. at 331; Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co.,
287 U.S. 92 (1932) (suits to recover preferences traditionally suits at law, not bankruptcy, and
were triable to a jury).
196. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (current version at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-
1501 (1978)).
197. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 339 (1965).
198. Id. at 339-40.
199. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
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rely solely on statutory construction to resolve the jury trial prob-
lem. The plaintiff filed a private civil action to recover lost wages
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA). 2 Congress had expressed its intent in ADEA to model the
procedures in private actions under that statute after the procedures
in private actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) .20,
Previous judicial decisions had established a right to jury trial in
FLSA actions; therefore, the Court presumed Congress had in-
tended to make ADEA actions triable by juries as a matter of
right.10
2
The three cases discussed above demonstrate the degree to
which congressional intent can influence the court in its decisions
about the scope of the right to jury trial.2 0 3 The following cases
involve situations in which Congress did not indicate the proper
procedure under the statute, either expressly or by implication.
Curtis v. Loether 2 0 involved a suit brought under a provision
of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act, 05 which gave victims of housing
discrimination a federal right of action. The issue was whether,
upon demand of one of the parties, the Civil Rights Act or the
seventh amendment required a jury trial in an action brought under
the Act for damages and injunctive relief.2"1 The Court found the
sparse legislative history too ambiguous to decide the issue, so it
200. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976).
201. The Court's examination of the enforcement scheme uncovered an intent that the
statute "be enforced in accordance with the 'powers, remedies, and procedures' of the FLSA."
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)) (emphasis by the
Court).
202. Id. at 585.
203. A question arises, but is not answered here, as to the power of Congress simply to
amend the statutes in the antitrust area to abolish juries altogether by providing special
tribunals to adjudicate such actions.
The dissent in the Third Circuit opinion in Frank Frey Jr., Inc. (affirmed by the Supreme
Court in Atlas Roofing) suggested that such a measure would render the seventh amendment
meaningless. See note 188 supra. So far, the Supreme Court has read into the federal statutes
an implied intent to provide for jury trials because Congress chose to have the statute en-
forced in article HI courts. Even those judges who have struck juries in antitrust cases for
functional reasons have not argued that a jury is incapable of deciding fairly in most antitrust
cases; the functional test requires only that the judge strike the jury in a particular case which
is beyond the capabilities of the jury. Should Congress decide, however, that antitrust actions
necessitate factual determinations by expert administrative agencies acting without the bene-
fit of a jury, there are cases which indicate Congress has almost plenary authority to relegate
the jury's factfinding function exclusively to such agencies. See, e.g., Block v. Hirsch, 256
U.S. 135 (1921); Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909). Cf. Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land Co. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856) (limits congressional authority to
delegate power to administrative agencies).
204. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
205. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1970).
206. 415 U.S. at 190.
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relied instead on an historical analysis, and concluded that "[tihe
Seventh Amendment does apply to actions enforcing statutory
rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates
legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in
the ordinary courts of law." '
The Court thought it clear that action under section 812 of the
Act ' s was analogous to various actions at common law, such as
defamation, and that the statutory rights were therefore "legal"
rights.20' It did not, however, go so far as to hold that any award of
monetary relief was necessarily "legal" relief. Therefore, although
in this instance the Court used a more traditional historical analy-
sis, the case does not support an argument that the Court meant to
abandon the use of functional analysis altogether. 10
Just two months after deciding Curtis, the Court, in Pernell v.
Southall Realty,"' faced the question whether the seventh amend-
ment guaranteed the right to trial by jury in suits to recover posses-
sion of real property. In Pernell, the cause of action also arose under
a congressional statute in which Congress had not clearly expressed
its intent. The Court examined the historical development of the
action of ejectment, an action that normally went to a jury. It con-
cluded that the statute created rights and remedies similar to those
of ejectment. This conclusion made the plaintiff's cause of action a
"legal" one. The Court therefore granted the defendant's demand
for a jury trial. The issue, the Court perceived, was not whether the
statute had a close equivalent in England in 1791, but whether it
set up rights and remedies analogous to those traditionally enforced
in actions at law."
2
The Court's return to a more traditional historical analysis, as
207. Id. at 194.
208. 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970).
209. 415 U.S. at 195-96.
210. See id. at 195. The Court stated that when Congress has provided for enforcement
of "legal" rights in civil actions in courts of general jurisdiction, and when there is "no
functional reason" to deny a jury, then a litigant has a right to a jury trial. This seems to
indicate that the Court would be willing to deny a litigant a trial by jury if there were an
obvious functional reason for doing so. Thus, the Court has not rejected the functional test
altogether, even for statutory cases. See generally Comment, supra note 161, at 313.
The author of the Comment argues that the Ross test was the broadest extension of
functional analysis to jury trial rights. The author contends, however, by using both Curtis
and Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974), that the Supreme Court has preferred
the historical test to the three-prong Ross test. Comment, supra note 161, at 314-15. The
commentators disagree. See Kane, supra note 157, at 28-29 (1976). Kane did not find that
the Curtis holding altered the scope of the functional approach, but she admitted that it had
a broad effect in the area of civil rights and possibly in other statutory actions.
211. 416 U.S. 363 (1974).
212. Id. at 374-75.
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in Curtis and Pernell, appears to have been limited to cases in which
the action arose under a statute and congressional intent to grant
or deny trial by jury was unclear. In those cases, if the action was
unheard of at common law, the Court could not apply a static his-
torical test and still grant a jury trial. The Court instead used his-
tory to draw an analogy between the statutory action and its closest
common law counterpart. If the statutory actions were similar to
those traditionally tried by a jury, there was no reason not to permit
a jury to act as the factfinder. It is likely that a court applying the
Ross test would reach the same result because the first two prongs
of Ross require consideration of pre-merger custom and of the rem-
edy sought. '3
VII. THE RECENT CASES
Since late 1976, four courts have struck a jury trial demand due
to the complexity of the litigation. In all four cases the judges relied
on the Ross test, particularly the third prong, to deny the jury trial
demand. Moreover, in two other recent decisions, the judge reconsi-
dered performance of the jury after trial. In those cases, the judge
recommended that, in the event of remand for a new trial, the new
trial should be held without a jury. In this section, the factual set-
tings in these cases are described in some detail in order to demon-
strate how the Ross test has been applied. The historical analysis
developed earlier in this article will be applied in order to demon-
strate that a lay jury cannot serve its traditional function in the
context of complex litigation. Additionally, before the cases are dis-
cussed in detail, the due process considerations alluded to in those
cases and throughout this article will be more fully developed.
A. Due Process Considerations
The Supreme Court has generally adopted a two-step analysis
for deciding due process cases. The threshold issue is whether there
has been a grievous loss of liberty or property.2'" After this determi-
nation is made, the Court decides what process was due. In complex
civil litigation, the threshold requirement ill usually be met, since
the litigants stand to lose considerable sums of money in damages.
213. See notes 238-71 and accompanying text infra for examples of cases in which the
Court struck the jury after applying a functional analysis.
214. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). In Morrissey, the Court finit
decided that loss of liberty was a grievous loss and thus protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment. The Court then set forth minimal due process requirements for the parole violation
procedures. See note 220 and accompanying text infra.
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Thus, the only question to be answered is what process is due.
Two lines of cases are relevant to this inquiry: the cases follow-
ing Morrissey v. Brewer,' in which the Supreme Court, as part of
minimal due process, required that parolees be accorded hearings
before "neutral and detached" hearing bodies (impartial adjudica-
tors),"' and the cases following Fuentes v. Shevin,17 in which the
Court held due process rights were violated if an individual was
deprived of property by documents signed by someone other than
an officer of the court. In other words, due process requires an im-
partial adjudicator who is capable of making an intelligent decision
on the available facts. Given that arbitrary decisions violate the due
process clause, the argument advanced here is that arbitrary deci-
sions may result when a jury sits on a case it is incapable of under-
standing, and that the decision of such a jury would violate the due
process clause.
In Morrissey, the Court considered whether the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment mandated that a state afford
an individual some opportunity to be heard prior to revoking that
individual's parole. Concluding that there was a liberty interest to
protect, the Court proceeded to determine what process was due the
parolee. Since the liberty interest was only conditional, 218 a full
criminal hearing was deemed unnecessary. Due process, however,
did require that after arrest, "the determination that reasonable
ground exists for revocation of parole should be made by someone
not directly involved in the case. ' 211 An individual's supervising
parole officer could not revoke parole. Parole could only be revoked
if the minimum requirements of due process were met, and one of
those requirements was "a 'neutral and detached' hearing body such




215. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
216. See id.; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1973); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973).
217. 407 U.S. 67 (1972); North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601
(1974); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1973).
218. The state has found the parolee guilty of a crime against the people.
That finding justifies imposing extensive restrictions on the individual's liberty.
Release of the parolee before the end of his prison sentence is made with the
recognition that with many prisoners there is a risk that they will not be able to
live in society without committing additional anti-social acts. Given the previous
conviction and the proper imposition of conditions, the State has an overwhelm-
ing interest in being able to return the individual to imprisonment without the
burden of a new adversary criminal trial if in fact he has failed to abide by the
conditions of his parole.
408 U.S. at 483.
219. Id. at 485.
220. Id. at 489. The other five requirements were as follows:
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In Gagnon v. Scarpelli,22 1 the Court extended the holding in
Morrissey to cover probation revocation proceedings, 22 and in Wolff
v. McDonnell,2 23 the Court held that proceedings to award or deny
a prisoner "good time" credits were also subject to scrutiny under
the due process clause.22
The Court considered a different aspect of due process in the
line of cases beginning with Fuentes v. Shevin.225 In Fuentes, the
Court addressed the constitutionality of the Florida and Pennsyl-
vania statutes permitting issuance of ex parte writs authorizing sei-
zure of a person's possessions. 2 16 The writ could be obtained in Flor-
ida by any person who posted bond and claimed a right to the
property. Even less was required under the Pennsylvania statute.
Notice of repossession was not required in 6ither state, nor did there
exist an opportunity to challenge the seizure at a prior hearing. In
this particular case, Mrs. Fuentes' property had been confiscated
under a Florida writ of replevin.
The Florida procedures merely required the repossessor to fill
in the blanks of the appropriate form and submit them to the clerk
of the small claims court, who then signed and stamped the writ.
The issue before the Court was whether procedural due process
required an opportunity for a hearing prior to the state authorizing
its agents to seize the property. 22 The Court concluded that the
right to notice and a hearing was required at a time when the depri-
vation could still be prevented.
In a subsequent decision, Mitchell v. W T. Grant Co.,22 1 the
Fuentes holding was limited and explained. In Grant, the Court
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee
of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present
witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses . . .; (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evi-
dence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.
Id.
221. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
222. The principal issue in Gagnon was whether a probationer was entitled to counsel
at a probation revocation hearing. The Court determined that counsel should be appointed
on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 779, 790.
223. 418 U.S. 539 (1973).
224. Prisoners in Nebraska could build up "good time" credits that could be taken away
if they were found guilty of serious misconduct. The determination of whether such conduct
had occurred was deemed sufficiently critical for the Court to require minimal due process,
including a hearing before an impartial adjudicator.
225. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
226. Id. at 73-76 nn.6 & 7.
227. Id. at 80.
228. 416 U.S. 600 (1973).
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considered a sequestration statute22' under which the seizure of
property was permitted by ex parte application, but only after a
judge of the city court gave approval. Upholding the statute, the
Court found that "[tihe nature of the issues at stake minimizes the
risk that the writ will be wrongfully issued by a judge."' 0 It distin-
guished Fuentes as follows:
Those statutes permitted the secured installment seller to repos-
sess the goods sold, without notice or hearing and without judicial
order or supervision, but with the help of the sheriff operating
under a writ issued by the court clerk at the behest of the seller.
Because carried out without notice or opportunity for hearing and
without judicial participation, this kind of seizure was held viola-
tive of the Due Process Clause.2'
Fuentes and W T. Grant may be read together as holding that
due process requires a member of the judicial system capable of
understanding the factual matters to take an active role before any
repossession occurs, and that absent a capable factfinder to oversee
the procedure, the taking of property is a denial of due process.
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-CheM22 confirms that judges
can be distinguished from other members of the judicial system,
such as clerks or jurors, on the basis of their superior capabilities
as factfinders.
Di-Chem involved a Georgia garnishment statute under which
a plaintiff or his attorney could file an affidavit before the officer
authorized to issue an attachment or before the clerk of any court
of record where the garnishment was being filed.233 The Court held
that the process in the Georgia statute was vulnerable for the same
reasons as the statute in Fuentes: "[A] bank account, surely a form
of property, was impounded and, absent a bond, put totally beyond
use during the pendency of the litigation on the alleged debt, all by
a writ of garnishment issued by a court clerk without notice or
opportunity for an early hearing .... ,,231 The only difference be-
tween the facts in Di-Chem and W.T. Grant is that in the latter,
the writ was issued by a judge as opposed to by a clerk. 3 5
229. LA. CODE Civ. PRO. ANN. art. 3501 (West 1960).
230. 416 U.S. at 609-10. The Court also stated: "The issue at this stage of the proceeding
concerns possession pending trial and turns on the existence of the debt. . . .These are...
matters that lend themselves to documentary proof .... " Id. at 609.
231. Id. at 615.
232. 419 U.S. 601 (1974).
233. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 46-101, -102, -401 (1974) (repealed 1976).
234. 419 U.S. at 606 (emphasis added).
235. Id. at 607. One of the arguments made by respondent was that Fuentes and W. T.
Grant dealt only with due process to protect consumers, while Di-Chem dealt with its applica-
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These two lines of cases indicate that minimal requirements of
due process, including an impartial adjudicator and an adjudicator
capable of understanding the factual setting, are necessary to avoid
arbitrary decisions.26 If such procedures are required to protect even
conditional liberty interests and small amounts of property, cer-
tainly a case in which substantial amounts of money could be reallo-
cated should necessitate the same procedures. In a jury trial, the
judge's role is limited to monitoring the trial and instructing the
jury on the law. If the seventh amendment is read as mandating a
jury in every complex case, the litigant forced to try his case before
a jury is denied due process: The jury is incapable of, and the judge
is foreclosed from, acting as a reasoned decisionmaker. If the third
factor in the Ross test was intended to recognize the same considera-
tions of fairness reflected in the minimal due process requirements,
as one of the cases suggests, 37 then deprivation of due process
should provide adequate grounds to strike the jury. Even if the due
process requirements do not elevate the Ross test to constitutional
dimensions, in certain complex cases, if the seventh amendment is
read as mandating a jury in those cases, the due process clause will
stand directly in conflict with the seventh amendment.
The due process clause and the seventh amendment should
promote the same goal: providing a fair forum for the'litigant. It has
generally been assumed that trial by jury will offer the protections
of a fair hearing; however, if the jury trial does not offer such protec-
tions, it is suggested that due process considerations should out-
weigh the right to jury trial.
B. Striking the Jury
The jury system has been under attack as incapable of handling
the problems inherent in complex litigation, particularly in anti-
trust and securities cases.2 8 Judges, despite their loyalty to the jury
system, have begun to recognize these problems and to grant mo-
tions to strike the jury. For instance, Judge Brieant of the Southern
District of New York struck a jury trial demand in Bernstein v.
Universal Pictures, Inc. 1
tion in a commercial setting. The Court rejected this distinction, pointing out that the
probability of irreparable injury to a corporation deprived of bank accounts was sufficient to
warrant the application of procedures necessary to guard against initial error. Id. at 608.
236. "[T]he [due process] requirement is intended . . . to secure the citizen against
any arbitrary deprivation of his rights. . . ."Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 124 (1888).
237. See note 264 and accompanying text infra.
238. See Shaffer, Those Complex Antitrust Cases, Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1978, at 16, col.
239. 79 F.R.D. 59 (1978).
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The original plaintiffs in Bernstein, a class of lyricists and
music composers, had complained that defendants had conspired to
restrain trade by depriving them of their copyrights to music and
lyrics written for motion pictures and television shows. At the time
the opinion was written, sixty-five plaintiffs and eleven defendants,
represented by seven major law firms, remained in the case.
The action was to be certified as a class action, but the exact
size of the class was unknown; the defendants claimed there were
400 members and the plaintiffs claimed 900.111 Because each class
member would have to prove his own damages under each contract
made with each defendant, the size of the class was an important
consideration in the decision to strike the jury trial demand:
In essence, as the defendants have aptly phrased it, resolution of
this case as to the named plaintiffs alone will require more than
a thousand "mini-trials" to determine for each contract entered
into by each named plaintiff what percentage of the performance
fee he might have been able to command from defendants but for
the alleged antitrust conspiracy. This in turn will depend on a
determination in the nature of a value judgment as to that indi-
vidual's bargaining position at the stage of his career at which
each disputed contract was negotiated. 4
1
The plaintiffs planned to call numerous witnesses, had pre-
marked 550 exhibits and had prepared 2500 pages of accountants'
worksheets in order to facilitate proof of damages. The defendants
asserted numerous defenses, including laches, estoppel, plaintiffs'
equal fault, and the "labor exemption" to the antitrust laws."' The
defendants had also served notice that they would call 100 witnesses
and had premarked 650 exhibits for introduction. Seventy deposi-
tions had been taken, thirteen interrogatories served, and eight re-
quests for admissions made and answered. To further complicate
matters, some defendants counterclaimed and claimed setoffs
against the plaintiffs. Four months was the estimated minimum
time required for trial-a conservative estimate considering the
problems of maintaining a full day of trial for five days each week.
In re United States Financial Securities Litigation"' was an
240. Id. at 62.
241. Id.
242. Union activities relating to matters such as wages and hours are exempt from
antitrust legislation. If the plaintiffs had been treated as a union rather than as independent
contractors, the dispute would have been brought under the jurisdiction of the NLRB. See
Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 517 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1975).
243. 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977). Judge Turrentine's striking of the jury was subse-
quently reversed in In re United S'tates Financial Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979).
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equally complicated case. United States Financial (USF) was in-
volved in large real estate developments from coast to coast and was
engaged in all aspects of development: construction and design of
various structures, financing of real estate projects and, through its
subsidiaries, acting as agent in the issuance of title insurance poli-
cies. USF had four and one-half million shares of stock and deben-
tures worth $35,000,000 registered with the SEC and traded on the
New York Stock Exchange. In 1973 USF collapsed, filing for protec-
tion under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act before converting to
Chapter X.111
Eighteen private lawsuits and an SEC action were before the
court at the time a jury trial motion was considered. The motion was
denied. Five class actions relating to various purchases of stock and
debentures during different time periods had been certified. The
primary issue was USF's liability under both federal and state se-
curities laws and under counts for common law fraud. Besides these
substantive claims, issues were raised relating to conspiracy, aiding
and abetting and the controlling person doctrine.
More specifically, the 20 or so individual defendants and the
80-odd corporate or partnership defendants [were] accused of
eleven different violations of Section 10(b), five violations of Sec-
tion 13(a), and violations of other sections of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. The defendants were also said to have vio-
lated Sections 11, 12(2) and 17 of the Securities Act of 1933. In
addition, common law counts based on negligence, gross negli-
gence, and malpractice [were] found in many of the com-
plaints.;"
The subject matter of the litigation included separate offerings
of USF securities and was complicated not only by the number of
parties asserting claims, but also by cross-claims filed by many of
the defendants. Complex and intricate accounting principles were
at the heart of the litigation. During the three years preceding trial,
various parties had taken depositions, and the transcripts from
those depositions filled 150,000 pages. Upwards of 5,000,000 docu-
ments were available for discovery. The court expressed trepidation
The court rejected a complexity exception to the seventh amendment and refused to read the
Ross footnote as establishing a new interpretation of the seventh amendment.
244. Since Chapter XI is mainly concerned with speedy composition of debts, it does not
contain the reorganization machinery of Chapter X. Chapter XI proceedings result in ar-
rangements with unsecured debtors. Under Chapter X, security holders can be included in
the plan of reorganization. See SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S.
434 (1940); 11 U.S'C. §§ 10-11 (current version in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.A. (1979)).
245. 75 F.R.D. at 706.
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regarding the introduction of a "significant fraction" of those docu-
ments, estimating that a total of 100,000 pages of documentary
evidence would be presented."' The potential magnitude of the
jury's task was evidenced by a comparison to related state cases,
which involved many of the same parties on a smaller scale. After
nearly three months of trial, twenty of fifty-five witnesses had testi-
fied, thirteen of twenty-four plaintiffs had testified and the defen-
dants had not even begun to present their case.
The court also struck the jury trial demand in In re Boise Cas-
cade Securities Litigation."7 That case involved the acquisition of
West Tacoma Newsprint Co. (Newsprint) by Boise Cascade Corpo-
ration (Boise) in 1969. Stockholders in Newsprint had received
Boise shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange at a market
value of seventy-five dollars. In 1971 and 1972, Boise had been
forced to write down its assets, which caused the price of its shares
to drop to twelve dollars. As a result, three civil suits were filed
along with additional suits arising out of a similar merger of another
corporation with Boise. In 1973, the Judicial Panel on Multi-District
Litigation consolidated these actions for pretrial purposes. Another
civil complaint, containing similar allegations, was filed in 1974.24s
The court estimated that, at the time of its opinion, the attor-
neys involved had expended over 50,000 lawyer man-hours and that
an excess of 900,000 documents had been produced. Because of the
complexity of the evidence, the court of appeals expected the trier
of fact to have difficulty handling questions of materiality, discount
reserves with respect to land sales, valuation of assets and other
unique and difficult accounting concepts. The court also expressed
concern about possible prejudice resulting from Boise's settlement
of the related state lawsuits.'
246. Judge Turrentine wrote:
The time and effort necessary to read and understand 100,000 pages comes a
little into focus when one realizes that such a quantity of paper forms a stack over
forty feet high (as high as a three-story building) . ...
The magnitude of the task for the factfinder is partially outlined by the
pretrial memorandum of the Steering Committee of Plaintiff's Counsel . ...
This document is 806 pages long, not counting the 18 page table of contents. ...
Id. at 707.
247. 420 F. Supp. 99 (N.D. Wash. 1976).
248. Plaintiffs alleged violations of §§ 12(2) and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and
§§ 10(b) and 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as well as violations of Rule 10b-
5. For a general discussion of these actions, see id. at 101.
249. The related lawsuits were settled for $50,000,000. Two issues in Boise were whether
the jury would consider the settlements as admissions of liability, and, if so, whether the
jurors would speculate that liability is tantamount to proof of fraud. 420 F. Supp. at 103. If
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The court in SEC v. Associated Minerals, Inc.2 also struck the
jury after applying the Ross test, but the factual context of the
decision is less clear in that case than in the cases already discussed.
Plaintiffs in Associated Minerals had alleged that defendants, by
participating in a fraudulent scheme, obtained $640,000 from public
investors through the promotion and sale of individual interests in
West Virginia oil and gas wells. Defendants did not register their
interests with the SEC. The plaintiffs asked for injunctive relief, an
accounting of all investor proceeds and disgorgement of all monies
illegally received.
Although all four courts that upheld denial of the jury trial
request prior to trial could only speculate as to the jury's limita-
tions, they all pointed to similar factors to justify their deci-
sions-complexity of subject matter, length of trial time and a huge
volume of evidence. In two other cases, ILC Peripherals Leasing
Corp. v. IBM 5'2 and SCM Corp. v. Xerox,2 2 the litigants tried the
case to a jury, despite the presence of these factors.
The IBM case, a private antitrust suit, was discussed in the
introduction.2" The reader will recall that at the conclusion of the
trial, the judge recommended that the case be tried without a jury
on remand. In the Xerox case, the judge modified standard proce-
dures to assist the jury. In a trial that lasted fourteen months, the
jurors were provided guidelines and transcripts, were instructed on
the law at the beginning of the trial as well as at the end, and were
permitted to take notes. In addition, the court submitted a large
number of interrogatories to the jury in an effort to simplify its
task.24 Despite these precautions, the judge was unsatisfied with the
jury's performance and suggested to the court of appeals that any
additional factfinding be done by the court without a jury. The
court supported its recommendation by citing the cases already
the jurors did view settlement as an admission of liability, plaintiffs would have leverage to
force defendants to settle.
250. 75 F.R.D. 724 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
251. 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
252. 463 F. Supp. 983 (D. Conn. 1978).
253. See notes 8-22 and accompanying text supra.
254. The court explained its reasons:
First, the sheer volume and complexity of the evidence necessitated focusing the
jury's attention on specific issues to be sure that orderly decision-making oc-
cuffed. Second, the use of numerous interrogatories seemed to offer some prospect
of minimizing the risk of retrial. That objective assumed special importance in
this case because of the extraordinary length of the trial and the presence of
numerous novel or at least unsettled issues of law.
463 F. Supp. at 988 (footnote omitted).
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described in this section. 55
IBM and Xerox are presented at this point to demonstrate that
the courts in Bernstein, USF, Boise Cascade and Associated
Minerals were justified in their predictions about the jury's limita-
tions in complex cases. The following discussion is intended to ex-
plain the rationale used by those courts that struck the jury even
before trial began. The USF court cited English precedent for the
proposition that English judges had believed only a judge could
render a fair decision in complex cases, particularly when the case
involved complicated documents.25 After discussing Beacon, Dairy
Queen, Ross and Boise Cascade, the court established the following
guidelines for deciding whether a case should be considered in eq-
uity: (1) a complexity of accounting not amenable to jury solution
or explanation by a special master; (2) a jury incapable of under-
standing and rationally deciding the issues; and (3) an unusually
long trial that would make it difficult for jurors to function effi-
ciently throughout." 7 Applying these guidelines to the instant fac-
tual situation, the judge concluded that the case fell within the
court's equity jurisdiction.
In the first category, the judge said "it is no more than common
sense for the law to recognize that modern juries are not capable of
providing an adequate remedy to those litigants whose disputes
involve accounting of complicated commercial transac-
tions ... ."258 Because the court believed that a jury would be un-
able to untangle and comprehend the USF accounts, it brought the
case within the Dairy Queen exception by concluding that the use
of a special master was not feasible. 59 Applying the second guide-
line, the judge concluded that the jury could neither comprehend
255. Id. at 1021 n.53.
256. In re United States Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 708-09 (S.D. Cal. 1977).
257. First, although mere complexity is not enough, complicated accounting
problems are not generally amenable to jury solution. Although such problems
often arise only during the damages portion of a trial, they sometimes are present
during the liability portion as well. Also, given the comments in Dairy Queen
regarding special masters, only a case in which such a special master could not
assist the jury meaningfully may be subject to removal from the province of the
jury because of complex accounts.
Second, the jury members must be capable of understanding and of dealing
rationally with the issues of the case.
And third, an unusually long trial may make extraordinary demands upon a
jury which would make it difficult for the jurors to function effectively throughout
the trial.
Id. at 711.
258. Id. at 712.
259. See id. at 713.
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nor rationally deal with the untangling of various legal theories
involved in a large number of cases tried simultaneously. Finally,
the judge thought it likely that the trial would last two years. In-
cluded within jury "limitations" were problems of jury selection;
the court could not ask a juror to give up his job for two years. This
was considered "beyond the practical limitations of the human
beings who would be asked to serve."2" '
When Judge Brieant applied the Ross test in Bernstein, he
concluded on the basis of the first two prongs that the action should
remain at law. The pre-merger custom for trying a treble damage
action was to try the case to a jury, and while much of the relief
sought in Bernstein could have been deemed equitable, plaintiff
also sought legal-monetary-damages, which could not properly
have been considered equitable restitution."6 ' Nevertheless, Judge
Brieant denied the jury trial request on the basis of the third prong
of Ross.
Although the Ross Court had not cited authority to support the
third prong of its test, Judge Brieant characterized it as a mere
restatement of the court's traditional equitable powers, for which he
cited both English and American precedent. He relied heavily on
accounting cases, as did the court in United States Financial, to
support his position that the Supreme Court had recognized that
complex cases were beyond the capabilities of the jury. 62
There are two problems with reliance on accounting cases to
make that argument. First, accounting was historically an equitable
action and these were legal actions. Second, although there were
accounting complexities in the cases, the plaintiffs were seeking
money damages, historically a legal remedy. " The courts would
260. Id. at 714.
261. Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 66-67 (1978).
262. See id. at 67-68; In re United States Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D 702, 709
(S.D. Cal. 1977). Both courts cited Kirby v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. R.R. 120 U.S. 130, 134
(1887), a pre-merger case, and the following passage:
The case made by the plaintiff is clearly one of which a court of equity may
take cognizance. The complicated nature of the accounts between the parties
constitutes itself a sufficient ground for going into equity. It would have been
difficult, if not impossible, for a jury to unravel the numerous transactions in-
volved in the settlements between the parties, and reach a satisfactory conclusion
.... Justice could not be done except by employing the methods of investigation
peculiar to courts of equity.
Id.
263. Mr. Justice Black, in Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962), a post-
merger decision, noted another problem with the use of accounting cases as precedent for this
notion. The use of the special master under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 had reduced
to rare occasions the necessity of resorting to equity. Judge Brieant recognized this, but
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have been on more solid ground had they used the accounting cases
to support the proposition that historically, remedies at law were
considered inadequate when the complexity of the case prevented
the jury from performing as a capable and fair factfinder. In other
words, the complexity of accounting cases so severely handicapped
the jury in its efforts to discover the facts that trial by jury did not
give- the impression of fairness to both parties. The court in Boise
Cascade alluded to this argument:
The procedural safeguards inherent in our legal system pro-
vide the impression and fact of fairness to the litigants and so-
ciety. This is necessary in order to assure obedience to judgments
and resort to the legal system as the only sanctioned means of
settling disputes in a complex civilized society ....
Central to the fairness which must attend the resolution of
a civil action is an impartial and capable factfinder. . . .[Alt
some point, it must be recognized that the complexity of a case
may exceed the ability of a jury to decide the facts in an informed
and capable manner. When that occurs, the question arises as to
whether the right and necessity of fairness is defeated by relegat-
ing factfinding to a body not qualified to determine the facts. The
third part of the analysis in footnote 10 to the majority opinion
in Ross v. Bernhard ...directly recognizes this.2"'
It should be pointed out that in Bernstein, Judge Brieant did
not hold that all complex cases were beyond the competence of the
jury. After examining the cases discussed above, he concluded that
the particular case before him was beyond the practical abilities and
limitations of the jury, and that consequently he could strike the
jury. To support his conclusion, he argued that a minimum trial
calendar of four months would make it "impossible to empanel a
representative jury in this case whose verdict would enjoy the ap-
pearance of fairness" and added that the size and complexity of the
case placed it "as a whole beyond the ability and competence of any
jury to understand and decide with rationality." ' 5
Jury selection was a critical problem in Boise Cascade. Because
of the extended trial time (four to six months), it would have been
discounted the value of the master's explanation of accounting problems when there were
larger problems of proof of injury and damages remaining. Proof of those issues required
extensive testimony about separate contracts, which was unsuitable for submission to a
master. See Note, supra note 14, at 904-11. The author of that note does not rest her rationale
entirely on the accounting cases and the adequacy of the remedy available at law.
264. 420 F. Supp. at 104.
265. Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (emphasis
in original).
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impossible to attract a cross section of the community to serve;
prospective jurors who feared they would imperil their employment
by a long absence would be excused, leaving a jury composed mainly
of the unemployed. The court was concerned about the diminished
appearance of fairness when a suit arising in a commercial setting
and involving millions of dollars in potential damages would be
heard by jurors with no relevant business experience. Despite this
limitation and the other concerns discussed above, the court said it
would not remove the case from the jury unless trial to the court was
superior. 66 The court then concluded that it was superior because
it was better equipped to determine the facts fairly. It based this
conclusion on its previous experience with complex commercial
matters and its access to tools unsuited for use by, a jury. Among
those tools were:
review of daily transcripts; admission of depositions into evidence
instead of reading relevant portions aloud; review of selected por-
tions of testimony from the reporter's notes and flexibility in
scheduling trial activities. In addition, the Court is able to study
exhibits in depth and carry on colloquies with witnesses, expert
and non-expert alike, in an orderly and systematic manner. Of
course, this is in addition to the Court's knowledge of the litiga-
tion resulting from its review of the record since the cases were
filed."6 7
The Boise Cascade court thus recognized the historical function
of the jury as it developed in England as well as the tension between
the seventh amendment and the due process clause. As the jury
system developed, special juries and jurors from the local com-
munity had been used so that the adjudicators would be familiar
with the facts. This was thought to guarantee performance of the
factfinding function impartially, truthfully and fairly.6 If the mod-
ern jury is unable to perform in such a manner because a case is too
complex, as was the situation in Boise Cascade, then the remedy at
law is inadequate. Striking the jury in that case would be consistent
with a functional historical analysis as well as with the due process
clause. The Boise Cascade court, reflecting on the due process con-
siderations developed throughout this article, suggested that the
Supreme Court had recognized the due process notions of fairness
and impartiality in its Ross test. Even if this suggestion is wrong,
the Boise Cascade court at least acknowledged that the use of the
266. In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 104 (N.D. Wash. 1976).
267. Id. at 105.
268. See notes 51 & 67-72 and accompanying text supra.
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jury in complex cases raises a due process issue."'
The discussion of these cases was intended to demonstrate that
a functional analysis can be applied to deny a jury trial demand in
a particular case consistent with both the seventh amendment and
the due process clause. The Bernstein, USF and Boise Cascade
courts subsumed the Dairy Queen exception into the third factor of
the Ross test. Although the judges analyzed the jury trial issue
within a historical framework, they were essentially applying a func-
tional historical analysis, rather than the traditional historical re-
sult test. The functional historical analysis has been the appropriate
analysis since the static historical test became outmoded after
merger. This analysis is consistent with the Supreme Court's prior
reasoning in the area even though in those cases that reasoning was
used to contract the scope of the right to trial by jury.
A proper historical analysis must include an examination of the
jury's function in 1791. When a jury cannot fulfill its historical
function, then a suit at law does not provide adequate relief, and
the court's equitable power to try the case without a jury may be
invoked. These three courts explicitly recognized the validity of this
argument, and the Ross Court implicitly recognized it in the first
two prongs of its test. Moreover, the Bernstein decision suggests
that the inability of the jury to act as a factfinder is sufficient
grounds to deny a jury trial demand, even if analysis under the first
two prongs of Ross leads to the conclusion that the action is one at
law.
Furthermore, this discussion was intended to show that the
Ross test is one of constitutional dimensions. In other words, the
Ross test is an accommodation of the seventh amendment to due
process guarantees. If a court employs a functional analysis and
finds that a particular jury will be unable to reach an intelligent
decision in a particular complex case, then it must recognize that
any decision reached by that jury will necessarily be arbitrary and
will violate the due process clause.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The question posed at the beginning of this article (whether
Judge Conti could have struck the jury trial demand prior to trial)
can now be given an affirmative answer."' On the basis of either the
functional historical test or a functional analysis taking into account
due process considerations, a jury can be denied when requested in
269. In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 104-05 (N.D. Wash. 1976).
270. See text accompanying notes 8-22 supra.
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complex litigation. Judge Conti, rather than first granting a jury
trial to uphold the right to trial by jury and later recommending
that there be no jury should the case be remanded,"' should have
concluded on the basis of his experience that the right to a jury trial
was not constitutionally mandated in cases as complex as IBM.
When the court applied the functional test, which considers the jury
as a factfinder, the court's own findings clearly indicated the case
was beyond the capabilities of the jurors to understand. Therefore,
it was evident that the jury was incapable of performing as an im-
partial and sophisticated factfinder consistent with its historical
function and the notions of fairness that accompanied the develop-
ment of the jury trial and existed in 1791. Moreover, the use of the
jury violated due process. The jury could not be an impartial adjudi-
cator or avoid making an arbitrary decision when it could not com-
prehend the facts. Thus, Judge Conti should have concluded that a
jury trial was improper in this case.
Because of the importance of the jury as an institution, the
decision to strike the jury must, of course, be handled on a case-by-
case basis, with due consideration given to modifying procedures in
an effort to preserve the right to trial by jury. In order to preserve
the right, such modifications would have to increase the jurors'
capabilities as factfinders, but thus far the alternatives suggested
are problematic.
One suggestion has been to assemble a jury of experts in the
subject of the litigation. While such a jury appears to be at odds
with the notion that a jury should be selected from a fair cross
section of the community,"2 historical materials reveal that such a
jury would be consistent with the practice in 1791.3" It seems un-
likely, however, that experts would be willing or able to give four to
fourteen months to participate as jurors in a complex suit.
A second alternative would be to alter the usual procedures of
regular jury practice to ease the jurors' problems with remembering
the facts and comprehending the issues in a complex suit. This was
attempted in SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp.274 The law was explained
at the beginning and conclusion of trial, jurors were allowed to take
notes, special interrogatories were utilized to focus the attention of
the jurors, and the jury was allowed to retire with exhibits, tran-
scripts, copies of the judge's instructions and copies of the closing
271. ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. at 448.
272. See 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1976). Cf. United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 568-69 (1st
Cir. 1970) (criminal case).
273. See notes 67-72 and accompanying text supra.
274. See notes 252-54 and accompanying text supra.
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arguments. Despite this assistance, the court was not satisfied with
the results and recommended that the jury be struck on remand.
Though one case cannot provide sufficient evidence on which to
base any conclusive determinations, it seems unlikely'that lay peo-
ple with no technical, economic or business background could be
educated during the course of a trial to the extent that they could
fully comprehend such matters and make a reasoned decision.275
In complex cases, where no effective procedural modifications
are available to improve the jury's ability to comprehend the case,
the court is a superior fact finder. As the judge in Boise Cascade
indicated,27 the court already has tools which aid it in the factfind-
ing process. In addition, as the number of complex cases increases,
the members of the judiciary will further develop their skills as fact
finders. It is already apparent that a majority of the complex suits
will be filed in large commercial centers like New York and Califor-
nia."7 Consequently, experienced judges in those areas will be able
to handle complex litigation with enhanced expertise and at lower
costs to the litigants and to the judicial system.
A jury cannot properly perform its function as a fair factfinder
in complex litigation beyond its comprehension. On the basis of the
historical functional test, the functional analysis of the Ross test
and the considerations of due process raised by the jury's limita-
tions, the judge has an obligation to grant a motion to strike the jury
when he deems the case too complex for the jury's comprehension.
Failure to strike the jury under these cirumstances is a deprivation
of due process.
275. In an article which suggests that judicial management rather than curtailment of
the right to jury trial is the solution in complex cases, the author admits that "employment
of the procedural methods suggested in the preceding paragraphs will entail the expenditure
of considerable judicial energy. ... Note, supra note 85, at 537.
276. See note 267 and accompanying text supra.
277. E.g., ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978);
Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re United States
Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977).
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